Track-2 dialogue: Capitulation to India?

Harsh strategic realities make India & Pakistan apart & adversaries 

Jan Achakzai 

As Track-2 between Pakistan and Indian is under way, the engagement in itself is an unprecedented move given the high level tension that existed since August 05 annexation of IOK by Delhi. Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa has been quoted to have said that Pakistan is seeking "strategic pause" through dialogue encompassing some degree of changes in the situation in IOK.

But  will the dialogue with India lead to a change in Delhi's policy towards Pakistan, or we  have gone soft on India to the detriment of Pakistani interest, are  the real questions? 

The dialogue will lead to a mere change in  rhetorics not in actual India's Pakistan policy. India's domestic and  regional circumstances have changed only. And the US has some pressure on both countries to play a role in Afghanistan by keeping a lid on India-Pakistan low level conflict so as it does not spiral out of control  playing out in post US Afghanistan.  But Joe Biden administration's India policy is structurally the same vis a vis India in the context of Delhi's China specific role Washington is seeking–since Beijing has been anointed as a "strategic challenge"– and was being pursued by Trump Admin. 

However, when it comes to Pakistan, India's policy is well entrenched and is beyond tactical level  normalization Islamabad may wish to get. Here is a guide that shows Indian intentions are everything but peaceful:

1. Afghanistan 

Only two weeks prior to the Quetta blast–targeting the Chinese delegation led by Chinese Ambassador– Afghan NSA and NDS Chief were threatening Pakistan while in New Delhi.

The main focus  was how to shore up the Afghan government in the face of imminent US and NATO withdrawal, and secondly, to protect the expanded  clout of India in Afghanistan. The theme both countries converged on was, last week, bluntly  articulated by Afghan President  Ashraf Ghani when he said Pakistan has to choose between war and peace. 

a)  Thus this policy of  threatening Pakistan through the Kabul government is actually the extended policy of India, put forth through its proxy regime, in other words.  

Coupled with diminishing leverage on the Taliban– that was the outcome the USA eyed; it  trapped Pakistan, and we got trapped–Islamabad has  a long list of enemies in the region with not one friend, it is about to  see an ominous prospect for peace in Afghanistan and civil war scenario with India playing as a sponsor of the regime. 

2. Kashmir: with behind the scene diplomacy with India - Pakistan would hope for a genuine change in India's Kashmir policy. Except some back and forth on easing life for Kashmiris in post August 05 strict restrictive environment, we would be kidding ourselves to expect any strategic movement on the status of IOK. But the cost for this engagement is already enormous and still accruing:

We have lost the  trust of Kashmiris who once we promised the moon and raised their expectations to unrealistic heights. 

Also we have paid a price by losing the support of our own right wing which has resulted in another big loss–limiting our leverages with Kashmiri freedom fighters, to teach India lessons if needed. 

We have done this engagement  at the cost of internal peace as many constituencies are discontent and others are confused.

 

3. Squeezed out of diplomatic space: 

That we use UAE's good office for talks with Dehli, underlines the successful diplomatic foray of India into UAE    looping other GCC countries including KSA and Bahrain with its maritime foothold i.e. port. The more India is attractive to GCC countries, the more Pakistani interests would suffer: financial loss, reduced labor market, reduction in  political support for Kashmir, besides, energy needs. 
Secondly, the recently heavy handed approach of Saudi Arabian asking for return of  loans when Covid-19 had  hit Pakistan very  badly, is also symptomatic of another problem: KSA has hyphenated Pakistan with its India policy as result started to look upon Pakistani interests (E. g, Kashmir argument, labor and energy need) from Delhi lense, courtesy India's "West Asia policy". 
Pakistan is still struggling to get off of the greylist, thanks to India's formidable diplomatic reach. Islamabad has paid a huge price for being in the greylist avoiding blacklisting: stifling economic activity, angered the business community etc. After meeting almost all demands of FATF, it may still be in the Grey list by the end of the year. 

4. Hybrid war: The latest Quetta blast and increasing spectacular attacks of the TTP/ISIS suggest the hybrid warfare against Pakistan is still a foot. And this trend will increase when after US withdrawal, India will be the net security provider in terms of capacity building i.e. training of Afghan security forces hence providing space to Pakistan centric  militants sanctuaries. Also many Pakistan militants who used to be a leverage in IOK have gone rogue and sought  shelter in Afghanistan as a result will have a "reverse strategic depth" against Pakistan on Delhi's watch. 

Given the Indian intentions and the evidence of history, India is not actually engaging in the  track 2 peace talks–Delhi is actually using this track 2  engagement to find soft belly of Pakistan for final blows to the latter's  repute and integrity. 

5) Its short term irritation with the Biden administration finding less attention in DC after the loss of Trump embrace is another motivation, it needs to show by its statements in the region, its eagerness of facilitation in Afghanistan when Washington is going to leave Kabul so it wants to reduce tension with Pakistan. 

But the larger picture of US-India relations is becoming a threat  to Pakistan as Indian policy makers are increasingly convinced to revise their "strategic autonomy" and make the US the main security donor (like Japan and Australia) after a long term border dispute with China, growing national power differential and other related factors. On its part, the US in its recently declassified “U.S. Framework for the Indo-Pacific'' assured Dehli that the administration sought to “accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security,” and “solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India.” What that effectively means is Washington wants to install India  as a regional policeman hence Islamabad should be prepared for a new level of coercion never seen before. 

This implies that trusting India–believing in peace with India–is not an option for Pakistan and waking up to this reality at earliest is the best thing to do. 

6. What should we do?

Raise the cost for India to blunt its hybrid war Pakistan has to fight on its soil and now in Afghanistan. 
Reduce vulnerabilities and seal faultlines to deny opportunity for manipulation.
Restore leverage of  Kashmir focused  groups who have been disbanded and pushed out into Afghanistan to appease India in the past. 
Modi is vulnerable for the first time due to spreading covid-19 should be  engaged through hybrid strategy in his home ground.
Reorienting GCC back towards Pakistani interest means we need to deny space to India's soft power and limit maximization. 

In a nutshell our response to India shall not be limited to the  executioners - it shall be in form that India feels the thrill in spine - to know that fiddling with peace in Pakistan is not cost effective for Delhi. 

Any expectations that embryonic talks (Track-2) will alter the trajectory of India-Pakistan relations and change the security environment of the region, is a long stretch. On the other hand, managing skepticism and mistrust in the country is an uphill task. Without a structure, a flatform, the most we can expect out of this Track-2 is forestalling a degree of escalatory options, managing tension and reducing some mistrust

As we enter into the next phase of Afghanistan and CPEC, we are facing a  dire need to protect our development from India's hybrid war. So nuanced understanding of constant drivers' of Delhi's Pakistan policy  is very important. 

Bottonline is from strategic, practical and domestic viewpoints, the normalization of relations will unlikely result in substantive change in Indian behavior towards Pakistan. And if history is any thing, whichever Pakistani leader who has bent over to appease India  has bitten the dust.