Gaza conflict: Iran strikes back
Jan Achakzai
In the run up to the escalation of Gaza conflict, the Biden administration called on Palestinian and Israeli leaders to step back, provoking angry reaction among Israelis which expected a stronger response from the US. Gilard Ardan, the Israeli Ambassador to Washington said that the US State Department call is not acceptable as he put it on twitter: "It is impossible to put in the same message statements by Israeli leaders who call for calm alongside instigators and terrorist organizations that launch missiles and rockets.”
The latest flare up in the Palestinian-Isreali conflict is the microcosm of changing ge-politics shaping the Middle East body politic.
The bigger picture now emerging is heavily stacked against Israel, and by extension its powerful backer, the US. Nationally, as a phenomenon, the conflict so far manifested itself into two ways: first, it showed that the Israelis are still struggling to have a decisive victory against the palestinian groups like Hamas, and Islamic Jihad leveraged by Iran as part of latter's indirect warfare against Israel; it also highlights the fact that the palestinians despite having been through relatively peaceful phase of extended length, are also faced with a new level of disproportionate might by Israel in the war of attrition.
Regionally, left to fend alone, Israel is adjusting to a new geo-political earthquake: after the US's increasing disengagement from the Middle East, potential vacuum is up for grabs encouraging regional powers to project from afar their influence in order to secure interests.
For example, Iran has clear ascendency in securing the geo-political space. It's strategy of indirect warfare against its major adversary, ie, Israel, has put Tel Aviv on the backfoot. To the Iranians great delight, the skyline of Isreali territory by Hamas and Islamic Jihad militant units were filled with the short range missiles and drones most probably acquired from the IRGC. Recently, the IRGC Commander threatened that Tel Aviv is never beyond their target.
And the last four days of mayhem and destruction suggest Iran can render Israel's national security vulnerable. So the aim (i.e. taking the fight to the enemy's door step at its will and the time of choosing) as a deliverable of the hybrid strategy is clearly within Tehran's grasp, regardless of the local triggers and drivers.
Tehran has also been emboldened by a combination of circumstances: a) as mentioned above,
the US has retrenched from the Middle East by withdrawing, ie, West Asia (e.g Afghanistan), and b) scaling down troops levels after meaningfully weakening terrorism threat in Post 9/11 World; c) Washington has also sought to revisit Trump's "maximum pressure startegy" against Iran and return to JCPOA signaling to Iran for some semblance of normalcy in relations.
The aftermath, has left Israel with new set of challenges: 1) Israel has to face new militant leadership of Hamas and Islamic Jehad with new set of weapons delivered by Iran; 2) after returning to JCPOA, Tehran will have sanctions lifted as such the country will have more financial muscles to invest in indirect warfare against Israel; 3) last but not the least, Tel Aviv has to content with the invigorated Iranian ambition to acquire nuclear capability regardless of signing on dotted lines of the possible new version of JCPOA.
Besides, catalysing Palestinian and Isreali conflict, which is a subset of extended Iranian warefare, the broken balance of power in the Middle East, will have implications for another theater ie, Yemen. It witnessed a new catch of Iranian arms delivery. To the relief of Saudi Arabia, the US fleet in Arabian Sea seized it.
However, the declining US military interest in the ME means they will be less willing to police the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Eden by default allowing uninterrupted flow of Iranian weaponry to the parties in the conflict enabling Tehran to project power and influence hence threatening the security of Saudi Arabia. The recent dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran will not alter the strategic calculus of the two countries and the most it can achieve, is some sort of detente.
Going forward, the whole Middle East will be seeking to recalibrate their strategy as part of the broader readjustment with the rising clout of Iran and the declining interest of the US.
That means Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE and their allies will be revisiting their strategies to establish deterrence against ascending Iran while Tehran, along with its proxy allies from Hamas to Islamic Jihad, the Houthis of Yemen to states like Syria and Iraq will be leveraging the new emerging scenario to their advantage. We are riding for a new period of instability and play of regional power politics, of course with dire consequences for the victims.
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