Hazaras—pawns in proxy wars in Balochistan? Jan Achakzai
Hazaras is a small predominantly shia community in Quetta. Their numbers have been documented about 0.4 to 0.5. millions. But their ranks are swelling as more Afghan refugee Hazaras are joining them in Quetta.
Refugee Hazaras are mostly being transported from across the border into Pakistan by the people's smugglers. Quetta is a melting pot of ethnic and sectarian communities leaving side by side in peace for decades, though. Yet today, Hazaras are targeted as Shias.
And the main reason is: unfortunately, Quetta/Balochistan has been a battle ground for proxy wars particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Sectarian outfits are not the Taliban but sponsored proxies. Iran has sectarian affinity with Hazaras. Tehran is being suspected of striving to affect demographic changes in Quetta, Ghazni and Kabul in Afghanistan, though Tehran denies these allegations.
Hazaras are accused of split loyalties: having religious loyalty to Iran and ethnic loyalty to Afghanistan's central Bamiyan region.
Other countries' footprints can also be seen all around in the country right from Quetta, Khurram and to Karachi. A fact once even mentioned by the US Deputy Ambassador Richard Hoagland when he referred to the foreign fundings/sponsorship of militant outfits in Lahore.
However, Quetta is the hub of international intelligence agencies because of long and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan.
Pakistani institutions are at the receiving end: dealing with geo-political dynamics of Balochistan by adopting counter strategy to check these agencies and their proxies.
At the moment they are more focused on Baloch militants instead of sectarian proxies. The Army is suspected of backing sectarian extremists, although it denies any wrong doings in Balochistan. It is also criticised for failing to inform people on the nature of the threats (since it must a have detail knowledge).
The provincial government is stretched thin: Police control A areas—about 25 percent comprising mostly urban centres of Balochistan to keep laws and order. They are under resourced, demoralised and can not stand up to sectarian and other militants. Two third of Balochistan is being run by the levies— a rag tag under-resourced tribal force.
However, the crisis reached a point of no return when the provincial government committed a PR disaster by staying silent for four days after the bomb blast tragedy whereas similar mistake was committed by the Army PR machine when it kept mum on proxy wars, foreign drivers and their counter strategy.
Federal government came in under tremendous pressure by the set in Quetta, particularly the dead bodies of the bomb blast victims invoked a wave of sympathy and a revulsion against the provincial government.
The government yielded in to the demand of protestors and sacked the provincial government. But the provincial government was used as scapegoat as It could not help shift state security institutions' focus on theses militants, check insurgency, proxy assets of other countries including Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US, and could not seal porous borders (where plenty of dollars being pocketed).
Imposing Governor Raj or Army deployment is no solution. Present Governor Nawab Zulfiqar Magsi has been there for the last five years. He has the same FC and police force at his disposal which was available to the sacked Raisani government. FC is part of the army. It is not easy for Governor Magsi to lay hand on his friends some of who are alleged to be involved in heinous crimes, for he being a tribal person, has to bear in mind the tribal tolerance towards other tribal nawabs as well.
The only solution for law and order in Balochistan is checking all "in sourced" and "out sourced" militant outfits—which is not an easy job. Security agencies have already adopted a piecemeal approach: so far they have succeeded to downgrade Baloch insurgents' tactical and operational ability. But their efforts have not been supplemented by the political solution that would have helped them free up precious resources including intelligence gathering capability and led them to refocus on other militant groups.
Since the province government has never been in the driving seat when it comes to checking threats emanating from geo-political and geo-strategic rivalries, as such, it should be restored to allow natural evolution of democratic institutions in Balochistan.
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