Call off Taliban's talks bluff: Jan Achakzai
Pakistani Taliban’s umbrella group, the TTP has conditionally offered to hold negotiations. Ehsan Ullah Ehsan, the spokesman for the TTP, said the TTP had always been ready for negotiations. In a letter to renowned journalist/Anchorperson Saleem Safi, the TTP called for repeal of all laws in Pakistan which are repugnant to Islam and added that the Constitution should be amended in the light of the Quran and Sunnah. Later, Hakeemullah Masood, the TTP Chief, also conformed himself the offer. He also said that the Pakistani government was following foreign dictates and talks would only be possible if the government would have the authority to hold them freely and end participation in the US’s war in Afghanistan.
On of the main coalition partners, the ANP’s response was a cautious welcome: the chief of the ANP, Asfanyar Wali Khan, said that talks with the TTP were possible if they renounced violence.
The governmnet’s reaction was ambivalent: it initially dismissed the offer by responding that"terms and conditions" were unacceptable for any peace talks to be initiated, (the Dawn). “They are a bunch of criminals. This is not the Afghan Taliban. They are not open to talks,” said one senior government official who called the Pakistan Taliban offer “preposterous”. “No one can take such an offer or terms seriously. "The TTP is not a proper entity, certainly not one any government can negotiate with”, was the response of Muhammad Zaman Qahira, the Information Minister, (Reuters).
However, in his reaction, the Ex Chief of the JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, urged the government to allow the Taliban to open office,(Mashal Radio).The liberal parties like MQM, ANP to, a lesser extent, the PPP would love to see the army launch operation against the militants instead of talking.
Electronic media did not take the offer seriously, while the robust social media went berserk rejecting any possibility of talks.
But assuming the government fails to seize the dialogue offer of the Taliban, what options do we have to counter the threat. The obvious presupposition is to launch a military operation. However, military option is hardly a solution because of the following reasons:
The terrain of the FATA region is such that it favours guerrilla warfare. It has always been used as forward position against the Russians during the Cold War. The adjoining southern and south easter region centred around Loya Paktika (Paktia, Paktika and Khost) and Konar and Nooristan regions provides a sanctuary to militants.
Any operation flashing militants out will force them to move across the border. After 2014, operating space will likely increase for militants.
Administratively, parts of South and Southeast of Afghanistan have always patchy regions. Even if the areas come under the Taliban control, they will unlikely to check militants' movement. At the hight of the Taliban regim in Afghanistan (between 1996-2001), likes of Riaz Basra-wanted to Pakistan- were hiding in Kabul. The relations between the Afghan Taliban, their Pakistani counterparts and the al Qaeda are at best murkier even today.
Pakistan army can not launch meaningful operation because there are other militant groups led by Malawi Nazir (who was killed in drone strike) and Gul Bhadur who are allied with Pakistan and are involved in attacks against the NATO forces in Afghanistan— not to mention the Haqqani Network who might be part of possible post-2014 political set up in Afghanistan. So clean sweep is out of the question.
Even if the army sheds inhibition vis-a-vis operation, there is no political consensus in the country. Main political parties are still divided on operation as a way forward. Hence it partly explains the reluctance of the army.
There are other lessons we learned from Afghanistan that militate against meaningful operation in FATA: Obama administration’s surge at best downgraded the Taliban and at worse was a damned failure, mainly because Karzai administration was not on board, the Taliban had sanctuaries across the border and the US was not ready to continue to sacrifice in blood and money. Almost similar situation exists in Pakistan: the government/establishment is not able/willing to continue to pay more in lives and treasure—not least, it’s relatively weaker strategic/tactical capability to strike against militants compared to the US. And across the border, sanctuary plus alleged connivance of the Karzai administration’s intelligence agency in sustaining some Pakistani Taliban, does not help the situation any better.
We are operating in a new geo-political environment where the Right is on the march, the Left and the Liberals are on the wrong side of the history in the Muslim world— from Tunisia (MB), Libya (Rightest coalition) to Egypt (MB, Salafis), and Syria, Jordan (MB), Palestine (Hamas) to Afghanistan (the Taliban) and to Pakistan (the rise of Dr Qadri and Imran Khan). It underscores dialogue with the militants as the best option for now.
BASIS FOR DIALOGUE
There could be possible basis for dialogue that could potentially knock down the thrust of the main arguments of the Taliban:
A: One of the major demands of the TTP is to end strategic alliance with the US and come out of NATO alliance in Afghanistan-which is a kind of rephrase of the first proposition. It is not difficult to meet because after Salala incident, the Pakistani military already declared strategic autonomy from the US unilaterally ending strategic alliance: we do not hand over al-Qaeda operatives any more; we do not launch operation in North Waziristan despite Washington’s immense pressure and we strongly resent drones attacks striking at militants in FATA, as a breach of country’s sovereignty. Declaration that we are not part of the US strategic alliance, does not mean rupture in relations with the US, to say the least. Anyhow, we will be fooling ourselves if we assume our relations with the US as strategic rather than tactical/transactional in nature.
B.The Taliban’s second main argument is implementation of the Shariat Law. It is not an impossible task either. We are talking of an Islamic country with 99 percent of Muslim population with a constitution slating in its clause 2 that Islam will be the official religion. Now, you might be thinking who’s interpretation of Shariat will be followed, my answer is no other than the interpretation of Islamic Ideology Council .The IIC is a non-binding constitutional body with having representation of all school of thoughts, can have more scholars including from the Taliban. The Parliament can legislate in the LIGHT of the IIC’s consensus recommendations. Two Politicians, namely, Moulana Fazal Rahman-farmost-and Imran Khan can pull off via a grand jirga consisting of elders from the Mosque and the Hujjra- two power centres of Pashtun society.This way, idealogical recruitment will come to a halt; the TTP will be deprived of its two potent but main arguments. A small number of non-reconcilable cadres will be left isolated and hammered at.
C: Simultaneously, we need to seriously take up the proposal of Mehmood Khan Achakzai who said that if foreign elements in FATA renounce violence, they should be allowed to settle in peace. This proposal can be taken up with the US at higher level. Intelligence agencies might have a better line of communication in theirs ranks.
The loss of thousands of civilians, politicians, political workers and brave soldiers is deeply regrettable. In fact the loss of one person is too many. But there are nearly million youth growing up without education and any job prospects in FATA, they will be readily available pool for the TTP to recruit more suicide bombers to kill more high profile targets and civilians alike whilst the odds against the military operation remain.
The TTP challenge is larger than the state institutions to effectively respond and will persist in 2013. We need a counter strategy yesterday, not today, not tomorrow. No strategy will lead Pakistan to nowhere. Stakes are high: if Pakistan resolved the situation, the blood of the martyrs would not have been spelt in vain. Otherwise, there will continue to be a “confusion, chaos and mayhem” well put by a social media Blogger, and we will be silent spectators.
-------------------------
The Author is geo-political analyst with vast experience in international media. He can be reached at janassakzai200@gmail.com. Tweet at Jan_Assakzai.
On of the main coalition partners, the ANP’s response was a cautious welcome: the chief of the ANP, Asfanyar Wali Khan, said that talks with the TTP were possible if they renounced violence.
The governmnet’s reaction was ambivalent: it initially dismissed the offer by responding that"terms and conditions" were unacceptable for any peace talks to be initiated, (the Dawn). “They are a bunch of criminals. This is not the Afghan Taliban. They are not open to talks,” said one senior government official who called the Pakistan Taliban offer “preposterous”. “No one can take such an offer or terms seriously. "The TTP is not a proper entity, certainly not one any government can negotiate with”, was the response of Muhammad Zaman Qahira, the Information Minister, (Reuters).
However, in his reaction, the Ex Chief of the JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, urged the government to allow the Taliban to open office,(Mashal Radio).The liberal parties like MQM, ANP to, a lesser extent, the PPP would love to see the army launch operation against the militants instead of talking.
Electronic media did not take the offer seriously, while the robust social media went berserk rejecting any possibility of talks.
But assuming the government fails to seize the dialogue offer of the Taliban, what options do we have to counter the threat. The obvious presupposition is to launch a military operation. However, military option is hardly a solution because of the following reasons:
The terrain of the FATA region is such that it favours guerrilla warfare. It has always been used as forward position against the Russians during the Cold War. The adjoining southern and south easter region centred around Loya Paktika (Paktia, Paktika and Khost) and Konar and Nooristan regions provides a sanctuary to militants.
Any operation flashing militants out will force them to move across the border. After 2014, operating space will likely increase for militants.
Administratively, parts of South and Southeast of Afghanistan have always patchy regions. Even if the areas come under the Taliban control, they will unlikely to check militants' movement. At the hight of the Taliban regim in Afghanistan (between 1996-2001), likes of Riaz Basra-wanted to Pakistan- were hiding in Kabul. The relations between the Afghan Taliban, their Pakistani counterparts and the al Qaeda are at best murkier even today.
Pakistan army can not launch meaningful operation because there are other militant groups led by Malawi Nazir (who was killed in drone strike) and Gul Bhadur who are allied with Pakistan and are involved in attacks against the NATO forces in Afghanistan— not to mention the Haqqani Network who might be part of possible post-2014 political set up in Afghanistan. So clean sweep is out of the question.
Even if the army sheds inhibition vis-a-vis operation, there is no political consensus in the country. Main political parties are still divided on operation as a way forward. Hence it partly explains the reluctance of the army.
There are other lessons we learned from Afghanistan that militate against meaningful operation in FATA: Obama administration’s surge at best downgraded the Taliban and at worse was a damned failure, mainly because Karzai administration was not on board, the Taliban had sanctuaries across the border and the US was not ready to continue to sacrifice in blood and money. Almost similar situation exists in Pakistan: the government/establishment is not able/willing to continue to pay more in lives and treasure—not least, it’s relatively weaker strategic/tactical capability to strike against militants compared to the US. And across the border, sanctuary plus alleged connivance of the Karzai administration’s intelligence agency in sustaining some Pakistani Taliban, does not help the situation any better.
We are operating in a new geo-political environment where the Right is on the march, the Left and the Liberals are on the wrong side of the history in the Muslim world— from Tunisia (MB), Libya (Rightest coalition) to Egypt (MB, Salafis), and Syria, Jordan (MB), Palestine (Hamas) to Afghanistan (the Taliban) and to Pakistan (the rise of Dr Qadri and Imran Khan). It underscores dialogue with the militants as the best option for now.
BASIS FOR DIALOGUE
There could be possible basis for dialogue that could potentially knock down the thrust of the main arguments of the Taliban:
A: One of the major demands of the TTP is to end strategic alliance with the US and come out of NATO alliance in Afghanistan-which is a kind of rephrase of the first proposition. It is not difficult to meet because after Salala incident, the Pakistani military already declared strategic autonomy from the US unilaterally ending strategic alliance: we do not hand over al-Qaeda operatives any more; we do not launch operation in North Waziristan despite Washington’s immense pressure and we strongly resent drones attacks striking at militants in FATA, as a breach of country’s sovereignty. Declaration that we are not part of the US strategic alliance, does not mean rupture in relations with the US, to say the least. Anyhow, we will be fooling ourselves if we assume our relations with the US as strategic rather than tactical/transactional in nature.
B.The Taliban’s second main argument is implementation of the Shariat Law. It is not an impossible task either. We are talking of an Islamic country with 99 percent of Muslim population with a constitution slating in its clause 2 that Islam will be the official religion. Now, you might be thinking who’s interpretation of Shariat will be followed, my answer is no other than the interpretation of Islamic Ideology Council .The IIC is a non-binding constitutional body with having representation of all school of thoughts, can have more scholars including from the Taliban. The Parliament can legislate in the LIGHT of the IIC’s consensus recommendations. Two Politicians, namely, Moulana Fazal Rahman-farmost-and Imran Khan can pull off via a grand jirga consisting of elders from the Mosque and the Hujjra- two power centres of Pashtun society.This way, idealogical recruitment will come to a halt; the TTP will be deprived of its two potent but main arguments. A small number of non-reconcilable cadres will be left isolated and hammered at.
C: Simultaneously, we need to seriously take up the proposal of Mehmood Khan Achakzai who said that if foreign elements in FATA renounce violence, they should be allowed to settle in peace. This proposal can be taken up with the US at higher level. Intelligence agencies might have a better line of communication in theirs ranks.
The loss of thousands of civilians, politicians, political workers and brave soldiers is deeply regrettable. In fact the loss of one person is too many. But there are nearly million youth growing up without education and any job prospects in FATA, they will be readily available pool for the TTP to recruit more suicide bombers to kill more high profile targets and civilians alike whilst the odds against the military operation remain.
The TTP challenge is larger than the state institutions to effectively respond and will persist in 2013. We need a counter strategy yesterday, not today, not tomorrow. No strategy will lead Pakistan to nowhere. Stakes are high: if Pakistan resolved the situation, the blood of the martyrs would not have been spelt in vain. Otherwise, there will continue to be a “confusion, chaos and mayhem” well put by a social media Blogger, and we will be silent spectators.
-------------------------
The Author is geo-political analyst with vast experience in international media. He can be reached at janassakzai200@gmail.com. Tweet at Jan_Assakzai.
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