Afghan Taliban : Who to negotiate with and why? By Jan Achakzai

 After the Paris Talks with other Afghan factions, the Taliban reiterated that they will negotiate with the US and that the current government of Karzai is a puppet regime. They revealed on Tuesday, Dec., 26 to open  Qatar office as HuffPost said: "The Taliban announced that they had reached a preliminary understanding to open the representative office, an unprecedented step toward peace negotiations that might lead to a winding down of the 10-year conflict. The statement did not say when the office would open".

The Qatar office is perhaps aimed at conducting talks with the US. The Office will be their address where their envoys will be based.

The perception of the Taliban is that the current political system has been carved out by the US. It is Washington that is likely to sustain the political and other  institutions in the post 2014 era. As such they need to engage Washington directly. Shrewdly enough they can still turn around to their followers—without losing face—and say: we are not negotiating with the Karzai govt, but with the Americans who have lost and want graceful exit. 

The Taliban are skilful operatives yet they work under constrained situation, only a political or military organisation might understands: the first far most pressure comes from field commanders who sustain insurgency through risking lives spelling blood and in return enhance the political leverage of the Taliban as a movement.

The second pressure is of public opinion: they can not be seen to be inconsistent in their rhetoric, posturing and PR campaigns. Any sign of inconsistency is likely to cast them into pariah status in the court of public opinion. The third constraint is the limit of tactical resources, idealogical and physical supply to sustain insurgency. 

The fourth constraint that they have to live with is geography: they need a sanctuary/ a strategic area that is far from war theatre yet close enough to return to after completion of a tactical mission. Hence, comes the role of Pakistan they have  to live with by default. This is why they are on the same page vis a vis holding direct talks with the US: Pakistan prefers the Taliban to negotiate with the  US because It believes that Islamabad, the Taliban or Karzai administration  can not influence the ground situation in Afghanistan. For example, if there is a ceasefire agreed by all parties in Afghanistan, only the US forces can implement any operational decisions in this regard; nevertheless, Islamabad is rhetorically saying that the peace talks should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process.

But the prevailing view in Kabul is different. In some quarters it is believed that Pakistan by enlisting its cooperation towards the peace process, has actually enhanced its bargaining position in the eyes of Afghanistan, Washington and London. That Pakistan is poised to achieve what it could not achieve through, according to their views, "sustaining"  a lethal insurgency, a more leaning Kabul government through the back door of Afghan reconciliation process.

They also believe that the Taliban by refusing to talk to Karzai government directly, are playing into the Pakistan's "scheme of things", perhaps, inadvertently: their refusal will  cast Karzai government in a weaker position vis a vis Pakistan and get it closer to Islamabad as well. In return, it will enable Islamabad to increase its leverage over the Karzai administration. The  short term worry in Kabul is  that Pakistan will join Karzai in his attempt to get elected his candidate of choice in the forth coming  presidential election scheduled for 2014. Of course, that is a viewpoint among non-Pashtun political factions who have fought the Taliban in 1990s and desperately want to take over the reign of the government into their hands, by bringing in their own man in presidential palace. 

However, having agreed to talk to the Taliban initially, the US got entangled into  Washington infighting: Congress did not agree to release Gontanamo Taliban prisoners when it's diplomats held first round of exploratory talks with the Taliban in Qatar—a core demand of the Taliban and potential indication of confidence building measure. That cost the US a chunk of its credibility, strengthened the militant Taliban and undermined  their reconcilable  political leadership. 

But this time least obduracy is being witnessed in the US attitude as it is desperate to ensure graceful exit; game changer turned out to be Pakistan's push for encouraging/cajoling the Taliban paving way for unprecedented  intra-Afghan exploratory talks that took place in Paris.

The shadow of Pakistan emerging as responsible interlocutor is larger than other regional players: this is why unwariness has set in in Delhi and Tehran for whom there are no "good" or "bad" Taliban but terrorists of one brand or the other, worth fighting and defeating every single of them. Yet this time the only difference could be their strategic/intelligence communities hedging  bits on some "good" Taliban (either of Pakistani or Afghan origin) unlike in the past when there was a wholesale disconnect between the Taliban ranks and these institutions. It is still to be seen which ways India or Iran will react to Pakistan's sudden appreciation by all and sundry.

Nevertheless, a week or so into 2013, there is a cautious optimism that things will pan out for greater intra-Afghan reconciliation and a once elusive regional cooperation on politically winding down almost 12 years-old-war theatre in Afghanistan might be round the corner.

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Author is an analyst and geo-strategist can be reached on janassakzai200@gmail.com.

Tweets @ Jan_Assakzai