Jirga- Why many could not get it? --By Jan Assakzai

http://pashtunchronicle.com/Blogs/tabid/81/EntryId/20/Jirga-Why-many-could-not-get-it-By-Jan-Assakzai.aspx


The four-day long Jirga in Kabul came to an end with fully extending support to President Karzai’s vision of planned strategic agreement with the United States for post 2014 Afghanistan. The Jirga preceded by wider criticism in Afghanistan and in the west. For example, the two main criticisms were: it was argued that despite the Parliament in session, Jirga was held: the underlying thrust of the argument was the lack of constitutional provision justifying holding a Jirga when there is a functioning Parliament.

The second argument was: Afghanistan needs modern politics and it needs to bring to an end holding of traditional Jirgas whereas political parties should be crystallising the grievances or problems/interests of the people through the Parliament. The above criticism mainly came from more-politically-active figures, intellectual and member of civil society belonging to the Afghan north.  Western arm-chairs analysts have questioned the legitimacy of the Jirga based mainly on these two arguments. 

However, a detached look at the opposition to the Jirga suggests that there are other misconceptions of the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan bubbling under the surface finding ways into public debate on such occasions. These narratives paddled by many have created misperceptions among the non-Pashtuns stemming, though, from some inherent difficulties besting political, economic and social issues between the Afghans mainly between the Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns that need to be addressed once peace returns to Afghanistan.

Let us scratch them one by one. First, many Persian-speaking Afghans while debating the problem of Afghanistan would say: Pashtuns are part of problem and part of solution; they would maintain that Pashtuns created the Taliban who do not agree to the rights of other Afghan minorities, among other issues. And Pashtuns are part of the solution if they are exposed to modern political culture (including discouraging Jirgas like institutions) while assuming them to be "backward" and anti-civilizational group of people. 

However, this misconception simply ignores facts: the Pashtuns in Afghanistan did not cultivate the Taliban and their predecessors, the Mujahidin. But Pakistan's official policy   was to support Pashtun Islamists starting from as early as 1973 under the Dawood regime. After 1978 and the arrival of Soviet Union 1979, the campaign of supporting Pashtun Islamists assumed grand scale: the west led by the US and the Gulf petrol money backed the Islamists and opposed the Pashtun moderate nationalists leaders forcing them to go into exile while literally undertaking the demolition of Afghan state and the destruction of the moderate fabric of Pashtun society bit by bit.

The cultivation of Pashtun Taliban is the by-product of Pakistan's over 30 years of strategic policy to eliminate the Pashtun patriotic and nationalist political elements on both side of the Durand Line in latter's bid to put an end to any lingering desire of the Pashtuns to reach out to each others divided by the Durand Line, among other strategic reasons. Thus the Taliban phenomenon is complex to say the least, and does not represents the vast majority of Pashtuns.

The second misconception in Afghanistan has been about the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali. It has been misinterpreted by some Afghans and western scholars. They ignore the fact that the code encompassing the political, judicial, and social spheres of Pashtuns is older than the unwritten Anglo-Saxon code including its judicial and political order.  For Pashtuns this code has worked for thousands of years and hence has to be taken into account and amalgamated while supposedly exposing the Pashtuns to modern state systems.

 The third misconception is that Pashtuns are the "major" ethnic group in Afghanistan- not the “majority” group. The misconception crept in when some pro-western and pro-Iranian scholars in Afghanistan, wanted to undermine the legitimate right of Pashtuns being the majority group of Afghanistan hence entitling to rule Afghanistan, paddled this narrative. Western scholars most of whom sharing the stereotyping of non-Pashtun scholars and orientalists also accepted this narrative.  It is conveniently forgotten that the Pashtuns created the Afghan State in the first place and they are the early inhabitants.

But the fact is that there has never been census carried out in Pashtun areas. While non-Pashtun communities and ethnic groups are by and large politically more active and organised hence better able to project their grievances and interests as compared to Pashtuns. Recent example was seen in Ghazni where all 11 seats of the National Assembly were won by Hazara community candidates in Pashtun majority province. It is not that Pashtuns simply disappeared but they did not participate because they are less organised and political active and threats and intimidation of the Taliban militants scared many away from casting votes.

 Thus In order to isolate the Taliban politically, the non-Pashtun political figures and intellectuals peddled this theory that Pashtuns are not the majority. So that the Pashtuns’ claim to power is done away with for ever.

 By and large Pashtuns dominate no political party in Afghanistan today. Even President Karzai has no political party where as the non-Pashtun ethnic groups dominate most of the current political groupings so are more organised in articulating their interest and favouring narratives supporting their quest to have the whole cake and eat it.  

This narrative could not be countered as well because of the complete annihilation of the Pashtun nationalist political movement and currents in Afghanistan, during the cold war, whereas only the Islamists left to be taken as representatives of the Pashtuns. But they were in fact in no position to counter this narrative while supposedly representing the Pashtuns in the eyes of others, for they in fact never represented the interests/grievances of the Pashtuns in the first place. 

 The fourth anti-Pashtun narrative is that they are against minority rights. The proxy Taliban's treatment towards the minorities in late 1990s in Afghanistan is painted as the treatment of Pashtuns in general towards others. The treatment of the Taliban is condemnable on its own merit.  However, it is far from the truth that Pashtuns are intolerant to minorities.

Not only in Afghanistan but also among Pashtun population of Pakistan, you will find Sikhs, Hindus, Bahais and Christians living comfortably even today not to mention other co-Afghans, showing how large- hearted Pashtuns have been.  The historic argument of Pashtuns/Afghan’s rule over Delhi Sultanate also supports this fact: it would have never been possible for Pashtuns to rule so diverse communities of Delhi Sultanate nearly 600 years ago, had they been anti-minority and sectarian group of people.

The Pashtuns were so tolerance that their ruling elite in 20th century spoke other languages than Pashtu in order to assure all Afghans that they are treated even handily. This is why even today in Pashtun majority city e.g., Jalalabad, 75 per cent of official correspondences is carried out in Persian language despite the promise of the constitution to accord equal status to Pashtu and Persian.  Ironically, most of the literature on Pashtuns have been written and published by western orientalists in the west not by Pashtun elite as they preferred to speak Persian at the cost of Pashtu. So the political   leaders and figures representing the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups need to address this imbalance: the neglect of Pashtu language at official level.

They also need a new formula to divide representation at all level of governmental departments in order to ensure fair representation of all ethnic groups keeping in view not only population but also the degree of backwardness and isolation of the areas.

The code of Pashtuns including resolving issues through Jirgas will simply not go away just because non-Pashtuns/Afghans do not understand it or because they wish it to disappear. Though the code is not perfect but it still works. It is unwritten constitution that lays down rules almost about every aspect of Pashtun society.

 It will continue to underpin the lives of the majority of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan until and unless modern but functioning state system starts to govern their lives. The Jirga institution is the mother of democracy and even ancient to   the current model of Westminster form of democracy. So is the judicial system.

Afghanistan is the motherland of every Pashtun/Afghan and non-Pashtun/Afghan alike. But it has been down to Pashtuns/Afghans more than anyone else that the integrity of Afghanistan throughout history has been ensured.  Excluding them from the Afghan state system is not only against fairness but also does not   foster stability and ethnic harmony.

 However, fortunately, provided foreign interference stops in Afghanistan, Afghans of all shade and background have a traditional mechanism to resolve their differences amicably. Yes, they have crystallised their grievances and interests in different ways but in the end sheer pragmatism has always prevailed in resolving intra-Afghan differences.  So it is time that the political leadership of Afghanistan address all issues that may hinder intra-Afghan cohesion and solidarity in Afghanistan and do not leave it to extremist fringe groups to undermine the  intra- ethnic harmony among Afghans.

The Pashtuns/Afghans need to be more politically active in political parties, movements so as to politically represent their interests and complaints well. Democracy and party-led political activities of the Pashtuns will deny a space and dialogue to the Taliban, and help the community to bring them at par with other politically active fellow countrymen. 

Regardless of  whether the  recently concluded  Jirga was more a  desire  for gaining  legitimacy and support of the  Afghans  for the US-Afghan strategic agreement,  or was  an attempt to by-pass the parliament, the process of integration and assimilation of Afghans  has taken a  battering in the last over thirty years, though; it is still irreversible.

Janassakzai200@gmail.com