Afghan peace: Pakistan a reluctant peace partner- By Jan Assakzai
With the visit of the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to Afghanistan and Pakistan, a new catch phrase came to light: “fight, talk, build,” to characterise the rather new US approach to reconciliation effort viz-a-viz various shades of Taliban.
To go by her pressers, conversations and sound bites, this was the main thrust: it is not a strategic shift in the US approach to militant safe heavens in Pakistan and the need to evolve a policy in the run up to and following 2014 when the US forces have left Afghanistan.
Contrary to what many commentators suggesting that “fight, talk, build,” is a contradiction in the US approach to the Taliban and the Haqqanis, strategically the US wants to co-opt the reconcilable elements within the Taliban and the Haqqanis, leavening out the irreconcilables; tactically, it seeks to erode their ability to remain a potent force by fighting with them “squeezing” them so that they do not extract big concessions on a negotiating table.
How far that will work, depends on Islamabad’s cooperation. In order to achieve this goal, the US wants to use Pakistan's influence. Although Islamabad may have a reduced influence with the main characters like Molla Omar and the likes but it has considerable leverage with midlevel commanders including the new generation of Haqqanis many of whom have come to the scene in the last 10 years studying in Pakistani madrassas depending on Pakistan for safe havens , financial support, strategic planning and family ties.
Mrs Clinton's visit was also aimed to save Pakistan becoming a spoiler in Afghanistan. She tried to give some tactical concession to Islamabad by dropping insistence on taking military action against the Haqqanis. In the same breath, she added that they (the Haqqanis) needed to be” squeezed” on both side of the border. She also said that she expected from Pakistan sharing intelligence on the Haqqanis and reining them in to prevent further attacks in Afghanistan.
She also indicated that if they are reconcilable, Islamabad should bring them to the negotiating table throwing the ball in Islamabad’s court to test latter’s “give peace a chance" mantra.
The visit comes in the context of new emerging realities that constrain Islamabad’s ambitions as well: It is isolated on its Afghan policy; the US is not prepared to allow those connected to Sept. 11 attacks to continue to roam freely in safe heavens in FATA. Afghanistan will have a US trained Afghan army by 2014; and Pashtuns on both side of the border have seen the brutalities of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda hence Islamabad’s proxies have never been so discredited as they are today.
Though Mrs Clinton's visit tried to bring the US-Pakistan relations back on track, in coming months, cooperation from Islamabad will only keep the relations on track. For Pakistan’s establishment, it is still living in 1980s time frame: for example, that Afghanistan is strategic influence area; any settlement should take into account Islamabad’s wishes; If it goes the other way, the Afghan proxies in hand will be unleashed to keep any future Kabul government instable and in check while using the traditional safe havens of FATA and other Pashtun areas along Durand Line as forward bases.
However, if Pakistan believes it has "legitimate" interests/concerns in Afghanistan i.e., addressing concerns on transparency of Indian activities, the issue of Durand Line, potential dam construction on Kabul/Kunar river, Pashtunistan boggy, Baloch militants' safe heavens, this is the time it puts all cards on the table as the US is prepared to listen and address Pakistan's legitimate concerns in order to ensure a graceful exit.
But the world will continue to be deeply suspicion about Islamabad's real motives regarding Afghanistan, if further quotes like the one from the then ISI operative Col Imam during the fall of Heart at the hands of the Taliban, “today Herat , tomorrow Tashkent”, emerge.
Additionally, If Pakistan’s Afghan policy makers do not strategically change their existing policy viz-viz Afghanistan, it will continue to cause instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan in coming years to come. That Pakistan is politically, economically and socially far behind, once its half twin, Bangladesh, among other reason, is arguably the by-product of Pakistan's obsession with its use of not state actors- the frankenstein dual monsters of extremism and terrorism to project foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and India ignoring the welfare and development of its people.
If no strategic shift is forthcoming and coming soon, Pakistan will continue to be hovering on the edge of a failed state probably over the next 64 years, as well.
It is time Islamabad learns few lessons from the progress of Bangladesh, not to mention the galloping economic pace of regional giant India?
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