Cameron’s remarks reflect new realities. By Jan Assakzai

(The Frontier Post, August 13)

The British Prime Minister, David Cameron’s, comments in India regarding Islamabad’s alleged role in exporting terrorism has understandably sparked a negative reaction in Pakistan. However, British Prime Minister’s comments were not the result of a slip of tongue or of his alleged diplomatic naivety. There are other underlying considerations that underpin the emerging new thinking in London. British policy makers have started to look differently to the whole gamut of London-Islamabad and London-New Delhi relations. Traditionally, Britain has supported the US broad foreign policy objective in South Asia i.e., to maintain a balance between India and Pakistan. That was part of the US strategy to preserve stability and promote its long-term interest in different regions by forging balanced relations between competing countries, for example, the balance between Israel-Arab states, erstwhile Iraq and Persian Iran’s balance and in South Asia balance between India and Pakistan. But for UK the role of India has become important in broader dynamic of its relations with the US. The Cameron administration came into power in the wake of some movements in UK’s ties with Washington, if not a shift. The treatment of British Oil giant BP by the Obama administration on the issue of oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico jolted British foreign policy makers to the vulnerability of their “special” relations with the US. The BP makes huge contribution to British revenue, economy, jobs and pensions. They felt that the Obama administration’s “campaign” against BP might have ended up slaying the goose that lay the golden eggs for Britain. Second, Britain as opposed to the US is a second line state but with a penchant to take on first-class-state-foreign policy commitments: fighting with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example. But the new generation politicians led by David Cameron tend to believe that London should not punch above its weight. It means there is a divergence emerging with the US on Britain’s indulgence in any overburden commitments for the sake of its “special relations” in future. How does India fit in here? For Britain, India is one emerging political and economic power that can help provide London with a new lever to work within its dealing with the US, on one hand, and can compensate for waning clout of Britain with Washington, on the other hand; for India is a regional power that can play a greater role on world stage. For example, some British policy makers believe that India can help serve British interest in G-8 group where it has an observer status and in G-20 club supporting British stance on many issues vis-a-vis Washington, raging from environment to European security to third world trade barriers. Third, another consideration is: India will be a home to world’s 25 per cent work force in the next 10 years that means, huge investment and economic growth and opportunities for Britain. UK can help India in sectors like, finance, banking, air space and military hardware. Last year Indian students (i.e., 37,000) going to the UK for studies exceeded the number (i.e., 32,000) of Indian students going to the US. Fourth, the economic ties of London and New Delhi over the last one and half decades have reached new heights: India was once so weak that London would call its ambassador to foreign office on very minor irritant and its Diaspora community was subject to discrimination. But things have changed dramatically: nearly five per cent of British Asian population which mostly comprise residents of Indian origin are contributing seven per cent in terms of revenue to the British economy hence raising the clout of India as well. “Indians’ first investment abroad is always Britain. They know about appreciation in the market. They already have properties in India and they think, why put all your eggs in one basket? These people are car manufacturers, IT entrepreneurs and Bollywood actors. They like the nightlife, they want to do their shopping and go to Wimbledon. The best place for them to meet is London.” (Sunday Times). Out of nearly 83,000 Indian millionaires, most have houses and some sort of business ventures in London worth in billions of dollars. The Indian Chambers of Commerce holds its annual meeting in London at the time of Wimbledon Tennis championship and in one room their combined wealth surpasses $40 billion with celebrities like former President Bill Clinton in attendance. The owner of Cobra beer billionaire Lord Karan Bilimoria is a member of House of Lords. Lakshmi Narayan Mittal from Gujrat - a steel billionaire - is UK’s richest person. Fifth, some observers in London believe that it is time that India should not be looked at through the prism of Islamabad’s rivalry with New Delhi and that there is no need to check India with Pakistani lever. They believe that India has simply outgrown the threat of Pakistan. For them India is a strategic ally whereas the relations with Pakistan tend to be more of tactical nature: seeking intelligence cooperation on suspected British-Pakistanis and Islamabad’s help in Afghanistan’s Helmand province. For UK, Afghanistan is more a problem for the US to realign with Islamabad than Britain as London has less leverage with Islamabad any way compared to the US to help British out in Afghanistan. Hence, there is a new realisation in London that British self-interest demands expansion of its multifaceted relations with India, even if that means hurting sensibilities of Pakistan. At the moment the US is manoeuvring to ensure a graceful exist from Afghanistan and as a result it has realigned with Islamabad leaving the balance between India and Pakistan broken giving Islamabad a lever (i.e., closer relations with the US on Afghanistan) against India, but for many this short-term tactical alliance will not last beyond the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The “confidence” of Pakistan’s establishment is likely to come to a naught. Pakistan’s most media outlets have given a prominent coverage to Labour’s hopeful leader David Miliband but they forget the fact that Labour is in opposition and it only indulged in political scoring when they criticised Prime Minister Cameron for his comments on Pakistan. There are least differences on foreign policy objectives between the Labour and the Conservatives. The frank chat of Cameron is the private view of majority of British policy makers and politicians, and they are not naive to understand Pakistan’s strategic game on Afghanistan. The past usual shrewed schmoozing and language subtleties of the English diplomats should not be taken for their naivety to take Islamabad’s public denials of not promoting its interest in Afghanistan and India through armed proxy elements, on the face value. Once a British high ranking military officer (I would call Mr James) serving at the UN Observer mission in both parts of Kashmir told me how rich his Pakistani counterpart was who proudly showed Mr James his farm houses and sprawling mansions in Islamabad. He said that if he (Mr James) amassed such assets during his military tenure, he would have ended up in prison in Britain for misusing his position. So the point is that Britishers have vast experience of closely working with Pakistani counterparts in many areas and they are well aware of poor state of the Pakistani institutions, and Pakistan’s broken society. Pakistan’s policy makers are living in a cocoon: by playing to hawkish media gurus, they simply cannot make up for Pakistan’s relatively weak geo-political, geo-strategic standing in the region and its heavily dependent economy on handouts of the West, including the US and UK. If they really want to grab the imagination and secure the respect of the West, in parallel to India, first they need to redeem Pakistan’s mortgaged external sovereignty to the US and its internal sovereignty to terrorists. Would they rise to the challenge, I would not bet a dime though.janassakzai200@gmail.com