Why premature victory claims? By Jan Assakzai

(The Frontier Post July 8)
Though the army has said that South Waziristan has been “cleared” of militants, and Swat is open for business as usual -tourism - the threat of the TTP has not been eliminated in these areas of offensive. The question is what are the reasons behind the army’s premature claim of victories?

The military officer responsible for the counterinsurgent offensive in South Waziristan, Maj. Gen. Nawaz Khan, said (June 30) that his forces had cleared the tribal agency of militants. Speaking during a trip to a camp for internally displaced persons in Dera Ismail Khan, the general told a group of journalists that South Waziristan’s political administration was overseeing reconstruction and development work including the building of schools and roads.

The general said that civilians displaced from the South Waziristan due to the ground offensive launched in October 2009, were in the process of being repatriated.

On the same day, the officer in charge for counter insurgency operations in Swat region, Maj. Gen. Ashfaq Nadeem, said security checkpoints in the area had been reduced to encourage tourism. Talking to reporters after inspecting a high school being rebuilt with Chinese assistance in the southwestern part of the district, Nadeem said that tourists could visit Swat without fear.

However, many observers believe that two senior army officers of the two major ground offensives against the TTP since April 2009 are declaring victory on the same day is not a coincidence. Apparantly, with the counterinsurgency campaign expanding to other parts of the FATA and attacks continuing in major urban centres, the army is under much pressure to demonstrate progress in the old theatres.

Although large areas formerly under virtual Taliban control have been retaken, the government has demonstrated progress. The deployment of large number of forces in Swat and South Waziristan, made this possible. However, the army has to move out its forces.

First the viewpoint of the pro-establishment analysts as to why these forces cannot remain in these areas indefinitely: They contend that counterinsurgency operation is costing Islamabad dearly at a time when the country is only able to service loans worth billions of dollars.

Second, while the army clears areas of militants, reconstruction is a task for a civilian government—-a process that may take years to complete.

Third, the army is stretched thin as it can not afford to reduce depoyment on its eastern border with India.

And fourth, the government needs to move into the many other areas where militants remain well-entrenched But there are other less obvious reasons that are behind the wraping up of these operations: First, yes, geopolitical consideration means the threat of militants is less equal to the threat of India.

The region of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan does not constitue Pakistan core: the political, military and industrial hub of the country—- Punjab— and Sindh with its coast. Thus, Islamabad is ok to live with a militant landscape largly intact in the border region and with a low level of insurgency brewing as is the case with Baloch insurgency. Thus comes its victory announcements and winding up operations.

Secondly, at a time when a new General has taken over the charge of the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the establishment does not want to reduce the cost of fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan for the US in form of eliminating militant infrastructure in the border region. This will make sure that the counter insurgency effort of the US in Afghanistan is intractable with little prospects to succeed within the timeframe and available resources, and by extension to ensure more reliance on Islamabad for diffusing insurgency in Afghanistan—which ultimately means recognition of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan at far greater level than thus far envisaged.

Thirdly, as Pakistan is pursuing a “forward” policy in Afghanistan at the moment to further deepen its influence, it needs the nexus of the militants to reduce trust deficit with its “Afghan assets” and their cooperation in post US setup thus making the need for a military action less pressing.

Fourthly, taking cue from the mood of the establishment, politicians’ proposition of talking to the Taliban is indicative of the different priority of Punjab-based politicians and the army establishment towards militancy in general as against the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which has demanded military action against all shades of the Taliban. Fifth, the threat from India to Indus valley outweighs any threat posed by militants.

That said, at tactical level, the army though claims victory in clearing the areas from militants, it simply drove them to rural areas. Despite the military operation it can not claim that war making ability of the TTP has been eliminated.

 Even in Swat, the militant threat is far from finished. From strategic point of view, though the areas under the Taliban have been taken and though it is a progress, the intent and operational ability of the militants could not be eliminated.

In the meantime, the militants will continue to threaten people in those areas where the army has been waging offensive despite the premature claims of victory. [email]Janassakzai200@gmail.com[/email] (FP  July 08)