Why Karzai can’t risk annoy Pakistan? By Jan Assakzai
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| The classified documents released by the organisation, WikiLeaks, has provided fresh ammunition to hawks in the Afghan government urging the US to come hard on Pakistan for its support to the Afghan Taliban. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has reportedly asked his officials to study the WikiLeaks. Afghanistan’s National Security Council said the United States had failed to attack the patrons and supporters of the Taliban hiding in Pakistan throughout the nine-year conflict. But despite some critical voices, the leaks dismissed by the US administration as "old hat" are unlikely to force Karzai to adopt a more hawkish stance against Pakistan. Hamid Karzai is perhaps one of the Afghan leaders of current generation who has realised the inherently weak geo-political standing of Afghanistan in the region and the constraints the US and Kabul are working under when it comes to dealing with Pakistan. Karzai already transformed himself from an idealist Afghan leader of his earlier times to today's pragmatic statesman mainly bringing himself closer to Pakistan. His conversion to pragmatism comes hard on the heels of some lessons he learnt during his two tenures in office. Afghan President inherited an Afghanistan that was almost in ruins. After Sept 11, the Bush administration’s botched policies did little to curb insurgency, change its fuelling dynamics and undertake the development of Afghanistan. Worse still, the West, including the US, used Karzai as scapegoat for all their omissions and commissions in Afghanistan. Karzai realised that the US and the West simply came to contain al-Qaeda and they were not willing to clear up the mess created in Afghanistan and put an end to cross border support for the Taliban. So he has to act in his own way if possible. In this context, the big challenge that came for Karzai was how to deal with powerful neighbours particularly Pakistan who is part of the problem and part of the solution in Afghanistan. The ideal for Karzai would have been the US heavily leaned on Pakistan to wrap up sanctuaries of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan hence removing the underpinnings of the insurgency, or if Afghanistan were in a position to impose its own reality on Pakistan. But both options were not feasible because of late he realised that the US has no leverage over Islamabad to meet his demand as Islamabad has established itself in the eyes of the US and NATO that it can use leverage within the elements of Taliban to ensure smooth exit of the United States and NATO forces from Afghanistan. On the other hand, he also recognised the fact that Afghanistan is militarily, economically and politically no match for Pakistan to meaningfully force Islamabad to get rid of its geo-political ambitions in Afghanistan and its sanctuaries. The vulnerability of Hamid Karzai and for that matter any Afghan President starts and ends with Pakistan: Pakistan’s contiguous geography and strategically kept unsecured borders with Afghanistan have been and will always be an asset for Islamabad to meaningfully alter composition of any Afghan dispensation to its choice, asides its historical leverage over the extremist conservative Pakhtun elements (which it has long cultivated on both side of the border) at the cost of Pakhtun nationalist and liberal forces in Afghanistan. So from his point of view, Islamabad is an elephant in a room that he has to live with. Thus his pragmatic instinct prevailed. He started to deal with Pakistan in his own way. First he toned down all his tough talk against Pakistan. In March, he visited Islamabad assuring that he would accommodate the interests of Pakistan. The removal of his intelligence chief was another confidence building measure to signal Pakistan that it has no intention to run any proxy war against Islamabad. He would already have assured Islamabad to reduce the number of Indian diplomats in Afghan cities close to Pakistan’s border - a big concern for Pakistan. With the removal of his controversial intelligence chief, the prospect of any alleged sanctuary for Baloch insurgents would also have been taken out of the equation - a clear solace for Islamabad. But Karzai also knows that although Pakistan would like to retain as much influence in the post-US Afghanistan as it can, to check the domination of its eastern powerful neighbour India in Afghanistan, it also cannot impose a reality of its choice as 2011 Afghanistan will not be the Afghanistan of 1996 - when its proxy Taliban bursted into a political void due to the internal fighting of Mujaheddin and abandonment of the US. He is also aware of the fact that this time the US is committed to strategically remain engaged in Afghanistan and create a government acceptable to all neighbouring countries that could deny space to al-Qaeda and its allies, and would maintain a relatively robust Afghan army and police force. For now what Mr Karzai is likely to make most of what he got to work with in realising a rapprochement with Islamabad and in doing so is likely to strive hard to limit Pakistan’s dominance as much as he can - a very delicate balancing act indeed. Thus the angry reaction to WikiLeaks seems to be aimed more at domestic audience than signalling a shift in his stated course of trying to enlist Pakistan’s support in diffusing the insurgency, nevertheless, staying the course, reaching out to Pakistan, is also fraught with its own domestic and regional risks for Karzai, which he may be well aware of. janassakzai200@gamil.com |
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