Regionalising fight against terrorism fails. By Jan Assakzai

(The Frontier Post, July 24)

The Kabul Conference was watershed moment in the effort of the US and its allies to defeat terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan what is called Af-Pak region. The Conference marked further deepening of the regionalisation of the US effort to combat terrorism. But the US policy of regionally defeating terrorism has failed in Af-Pak region. The ragionalisation of the fight against terrorism i.e. involving the cooperation of regional/host countries has so far created positive results in other parts of the world. Particularly, it has seen a steady progress in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Indonesia, while in Yemen the authorities are struggling to contain the al-Qaeda movement with the US help. But the jury is still out on Somalia. As far as Af-Pak region is concerned, the overriding aim of the US effort was to defeat terrorism that emanated from this region spearheaded by al-Qaeda and its allies, the Taliban. But over the last couple of years, the US has scaled back on the main objective of defeating terrorism and seems to have further sought to regionally contain the monster. With the US and its’ allies resolve in Afghanistan wavering, nexus of terrorism: al-Qaeda, the elements of Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts, is still intact, and as the draw down deadline is set, a naive would believe that militant landscape would simply diffuse itself and militants would happily go home with the feelings that as they have won, now rest time. Yes, so far al-Qaeda organisation has been boxed in Pakistan and Afghanistan border. Yes, its strategic, tactically and operational ability has been weakened. Yes, its core operational leadership stands knocked down. But, has the safe haven on Afghanistan-Pakistan border been put out of the equation? Has the regionalising of the job of terrorism through the half hearted cooperation of Pakistan enhanced the security of the people of the region and of the US homeland? The answer is: a big No. For simple reason, the objective of Pakistan in its fight against terrorism is in sharp contrast to that of the US. Pakistan does not believe that the al-Qaeda-led militancy is an existential threat. Pakistan has proxy militant landscape at its hand to be used if need be in order to contain India’s military superiority, or enhance influence in Afghanistan, as its strategic community’s threat perception is shaped by Indian rivalry. Secondly, the militancy threat has become a strategic bargaining chip for Pakistan on the negotiating table with Afghanistan and by extension with Washington, to extract more concessions. Pakistani policy makers, and public opinion makers often question the concessions they extract from the US for fighting extremism and militancy in the county for being less than desirable. Some have gone even to suggest that Pakistan should stop the fight against al-Qaeda as it receives less monetary benefits in exchange. Dealing with Pakistan, the US has used the policy of carrot and stick which has not produced much results. The selective tactical cooperation of Pakistani authorities run against their strategic ambivalence, at best, towards forces of terrorism and support, at worse, to others. The anti-Pakistani militant outfits though have been contained for a while, but not out of business. Their allied-Punjab-based outfits, are still posing threat to regional peace. Any Attack on Indian soil emanating from Pakistan will put the two countries on a collision course. On the other hand, any footprint of "Islamic Emarat of Waziristan" in possible attack on the US homeland will invoke the wrath of Washington and unforeseen consequences. At official level, the establishment has vetoed so far any operation in Waziristan for strategic reason. This is why the state is reluctant to take on the epic centre of terrorism. It is the only piece of geography perhaps in the world that is off limit for journalists, researchers and independent observers but is open to Jehadists from Central Asia to the Caucasus to the Somalia to the Europe and the US. The Western governments including the United States, are facing elections before 2014, and this is why in most cases elected politicians are under pressure to show quick progress in their fight against terrorism, thus the draw down time tables as if mission accomplished. But the US half commitment under Bush administration was not even equivalent to the one-third of the commitment, strategy, resources, and imagination of the present Obama administration which came to power only about two and half years ago marking the fight against terrorism in earnest. In other words serious effort by the administration was launched only after the election of President Obama who reviewed the fight against extremism and terrorism in Af-Pak region. Nonetheless, the western fatigued governments have adopted one of the two attitudes towards fight against terrorism and extremism in Af-Pak region: it can be characterised by swings between populist and morally correct attitudes. The populist policy is adopted when the people want or what is popular amongst voters. The second policy is based on a morally correct discourse, for example: it is morally compelling to go after al-Qaeda who killed innocent people on the streets of London, Washington and New York justifying the Western effort in Af-Pak region. But there is the third policy which is called the right policy. The right policy stems from the needs dictated by ground reality. So what is the ground reality? Simply summed up, the Af-Pak region remain the epicentre of terrorism. Secondly, the US failed to regionally contain the threat, thirdly, the US and its allies have scaled down their objective of defeating terrorism to more convenient and water down option: containment. But regional containment policy of terrorism in Af-Pak region only promises to keep the region as constant threat to global security. janassakzai200@gamil.com