Post-US Afghanistan likely scenario: By Jan Assakzai

http://www.thefrontierpost.com/News.aspx?ncat=ar&nid=1278

A keen reader based in Peshawar sent me a few questions regarding the future scenarios likely unfolding in post-US Afghanistan. I have attempted to speculate as to what likely will be the shape of things in Afghanistan and potential impact on Pakistan or on what the US call Afg-Pak region. For the benefit of readers, I would like to share these questions in Q & A guide. Q: Is US against only al-Qaeda or Taliban too? A: The US has no problem with the Taliban as long as it did not harm Washington’s interest by sheltering al-Qaeda organisation. The Taliban despite the general anti-American Jehadi rhetorics, do not have the intent, strategic, operational and tactical ability to attack the US interest all over the world including homeland security as opposed to al-Qaeda organisation which is a threat both strategic and tactical. Although Afghan Taliban are multi-faceted and diffused phenomenon, presumably, they are confining themselves to Afghanistan’s borders. So the qualified answer is no as the US has also kind of bought into the narrative of Pakistan based think tanks that the Afghan Taliban or indigenous movement that cannot be wiped out militarily, thus inadvertently creating a self fulfilling prophecy that the Taliban are a kind of Viet Cong of Vietnam. But if to go by the present landscape of militancy on the either side of the Durand Line, there seems to be a loose command structure with the powerful left-over-of al-Qaeda organisation on the top linked by the Afghan, the Pakistani (both the Pakhtun and the Punjabi) Taliban with sub-units having an operational freedom to act within their area depending solely on their operational ability not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. Q: What will be the grounds/interests on which US will continue helping Afghan government against the Taliban? A: From the US point of view, it has hugely invested in Afghanistan in blood and money and must not strategically abandon the country as it did in 1990s which created a strategic Tsunami for the US culminating in Sept 11 attacks. Washington will try to strategically engage in Afghanistan and support whichever government takes over but with big caveats: First, much depends on current strategy (if) it achieves its aim: secure population centres; develop elite army and police units to carry anti-insurgency fight; and soften the reconcilable Taliban with the help of Pakistan to coalesce with the Afghan government. There are certain movements though not a shift in its strategy as yet, for example: the Republicans criticised President Obama for draw down deadline, the Iraqi draw down is touted as parallel now: living at least 100,000 troops in Afghanistan beyond 2011; secondly on the Kandahar operation front, the Afghan police elite force is showing some sign of progress. (Also remember, the objective of Marjah and Kandahar operation were never meant to defeat the Taliban but to secure population centres, break Taliban’s logistical supply line, provide alternative socio-economic governance model). But progress within the current resources and strategy and time frame is unlikely to be enough, unless goals of the strategy are redefined and time frame is extended. Second, Iran’s role is going to be very important: If relations between the US and Iraq remain frosty, Tehran can make things difficult for the US through its proxy levers as it is trying to do in Iraq thus forcing Washington to remain engaged militarily at least for next couple of years. But it also all boils down to the US grand strategic interest at the global level. No matter whatever shape things take place in Afghanistan, and may be in Iraq as well in the longer run, for the US, any pay off in terms of keeping bulk of its military forces in these two countries is less than the potential advantage of bringing back its troops to international system. In other words the troops have to come home no matter what; it is just a matter of few months may be a year or two here and there. Thus the US engagement is likely to be strategic, diplomatic with a few military bases. Q: If US withdraws after achieving its target (dismantling al-Qeada) what will be the scenario of the Afg-pak region? A: If the US troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the central government will continue to rely on neighboring states’ goodwill not to pull the rug under its feet, particularly Pakistan. Pakistan has the potential to impose a military reality. The US and other regional countries do not have linguistic and intelligence asset in the Afghan Taliban ranks nor they have the potential compared to Pakistan. This is why they need to fill in the intelligence gap by drafting Pakistan’s support. As far as Pakistan is concerned, common sense would dictate that Islamabad would not seek an overwhelming dominance of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan as it has problem of the TTP, the al-Qaeda remnants and Punjabi Taliban who will simply re-establish bases in Kandahar and Jalalabad as was the case before the invasion of the US in 2001, even if the Afghan army and police are powerful enough deny them sanctuaries. T he Taliban before 2001 did not want to remove the anti-Pakistan elements from Afghanistan. Even today, Pakistan cannot stop the free moment of the Baloch insurgents, the LeT, the TTP Swat and the rest in and out of Afghanistan. Think of the scenario what will happen when the Taliban take over the control of the neighbouring provinces. But unfortunately the strategic policies of Pakistan’s establishment has been bereft of long term interest of the country. For India, in the meantime, the prospects of political settlement for the top Taliban leadership would mean sleepless nights seeing Islamabad’s friendly militants are the main opposition to be co-opted in Afghanistan. New Delhi simply cannot see the Taliban again controlling Afghanistan. So far it has only relied upon political and economic pulls to influence the situation in Afghanistan. If it is decided to raise military stakes shifting strategic policy on Afghanistan, it will simply turn Afghanistan into battleground as for Islamabad, a foot hold in Afghanistan is imperative for its extension of strategic depth to secure its eastern border from hostile New Delhi. Thus it cannot allow India militarily fishing in its “strategic depth”. From another angle, for India Pakistan’s potential internal anarchy would also mean more room for the militants to manoeuver and more focus on India to target. Thus it may prefer not to implement the talk of raising military stakes in Afghanistan and it may not want to see a further erosion of Pakistan’s ability to contain militancy as well. Hence India’s hands would be tied between bad and worse options on Afghanistan, and for that matter on Pakistan as well. Q: Would the Afghan Taliban be pacified and defeated or they will continue their activities with strength after US and NATO withdrawal? A: The Taliban can be contained iF the US improvise its counter-insurgency by securing the population centres along the ring road enough from internal and external threats, by training enough Afghan army and police units to continue counter-insurgency strategy once they withdraw, by incentivising Islamabad to give up on militant infrastructure. The likely scenario would be Pakistan might recognise Karzai as post US Afghan leader with pro-Pakistani Taliban joining the coalition. If this happens it will mark a shift in Pakistan’s establishment policy as it will for the first time be supporting the Pakhtun centre Left, beside the Pakhtun extremist right. It would have greater implication for the Pakhtun centre left in Afghanistan. The left over of the Taliban groups may continue to fight but Kabul and Islamabad can leave with any low level of insurgency, provided it has no organised state sponsor’s backing. Q: Would Karzai government hold up to the Taliban resistance or not after US/NATO departure? A: Again it depends on the conditions the US and Pakistan create or fail to create in coming year or years but the Karzai government will hold up to any resistance. For the Taliban’s operational ability is based on IEDs, deployment of lightly armed units, and targeting soft targets. Their main success is in employing the tactic of terror and intimidation and capitalising on the fact that people have not alternative socio-economic-military alternative thus far. Besides, if leaders like Karzai form political groups in the south, the centre left Pakthun political forces will simply challenge the Taliban in every street of Southern Afghanistan. For this I will give the example of Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas where the centre left nationalists have been challenging the narratives of the Taliban head on (as is the case of Pakhtun centre left in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who have bravely stood to the threat of the Taliban). The Taliban in these areas (Swat situation was different, however) could not openly take over as compared to the situation in FATA where the Pakhtun centre left political forces have not been allowed to operate to challenge the extreme Pakhtun Right—not only the Pakistani local version but also the Afghan version. Q: If Karzai government opted to hold talks with Taliban what will be the agenda of such talks and its outcome? A: The Taliban might want more concessions: Islamising the constitution according to their version, establishment of their Qazaia system or judiciary, insisting on symbolic acts like growing beard in offices, establishing prayers in public, a bit of religious policing provision, veil for women etc. But the biggest pressure will be whether they accept the one-man-one-vote-system . The US and Pakistan can greatly alter the situation in case they support the secular Pakhtun centre left on either side of the border which is equally amenable to all concerns of Islamabad (and the US) including Durand Line, giving up on Indian presence along Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and denying sanctuary for Baloch insurgents, etc. Q: In talks some compromises and concessions are given by the parties to each other so some demands of the Taliban will be definitely accommodated. What can be such demands and what be their impacts in case of its acceptance by Kabul government ? A: Apart from symbolic demands and gestures, their main demands of the foreign troops would stand dissolved. However, some cabinet posts, including governorships will allure them. But I think the most likely scenario could be a Pakistani style MMA government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Ultimately, for Kabul it would have simply a price it has to pay to accommodate proxy and insurgents alike due to its inherent geographical, military and economic vulnerability. Thus Afghanistan would be another litmus test for the battle of ideals of the Pakhtun centre left, the extreme right, on one hand, and the sponsors of these two domineering forces, on the other hand. Who will win depends on Afghanistan becoming a 21st century nation state with the help of huge investment in money, energy and commitment by the developed nations of the world which seems at the moment a far cry. Whichever way Afghanistan goes, I hope it become at least Yemen, not Somalia. janassakzai200@gamil.com