Post-US Afghanistan and geo-political contest: By Jan Assakzai
(Frontier Post July 05)
In the next 12 months, most of the United States forces will probably be packing up to leave Afghanistan as President Obama has outlined the draw down timetable for 2011. All hopes are pinned on the new Afghan Army and the elite police force to fill in the shows of the departing US troops. The US went to Afghanistan with the view to deny al-Qaeda safe haven, dislodge the Taliban and establish an Afghan government with capability to stand on its.
Over the last nine years, the US goals though have changed, however, there are fears that the post US Afghanistan will become a battle ground for the geo-political contest of regional powers. Some interests of these regional powers converge with the US long- term strategic goals while other’s do not coincide.
For example, China would like to see Afghanistan not being dominated again by fundamentalists so that they do not serve as a base for encouraging militancy and extremism in its Sinkiang province. China fears Uighur militants are operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan-- as well Central Asia-- and from there they could potentially plot and launch attacks against China. Sinkiang is an autonomous region (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) and borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India and has abundant oil reserves and is China’s largest natural gas-producing region. At least Chinese will be happy the US has done the job for them---going after headquarter of international terrorist centre in Afghanistan.
Iran wants to see the end of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban calling shots in Afghanistan and with its Shia dominated region safe and secured. In other words, Iran would like to see Shia minority in Afghanistan is not persecuted and excluded from the power sharing. For Iran the need to have a proxy useful at least in the medium terms is not going to disappear.
To the north of Afghanistan, the big giant is Russia: Russia has so much at stake in Afghanistan, its soft belly--area of influence is central Asian states that remain susceptible to Islamic extremism. As a guarantor to the security of central Asian states, Russia sees any potential spill over to this region as anathema. Hence, Moscow would like to see a semblance of stability in Afghanistan that could stop the origination of extremism.
However, the dictates of geo-political imperatives put Russia in an awkward position as well. Supposedly, post US Afghanistan turns out stable enough to become an energy corridor for supply of oil and gas resources of central Asian states linking central Asia with the South and South East Asia, it would compromise the Russia’s ability to remain the regional and international energy power hub meeting the needs of Europe and possibly beyond.
With alternative transit routes by-passing Russian influence is not Moscow would wish for. So Russia would lose sleep if Afghanistan offered energy transit route connecting India and China with Central Asian states. Additionally, the Taliban or insurgents are likely less to be lethal after the US withdrawal. Afghan army might be able to ensue the security of any possible pipeline, likening Pakistan’s Balochistan situation where there is a low level insurgency going on yet it has not threatened the existing gas supply, and at its existing level may not be able to jeopardise any potential pipeline coming from Iran en route Balochistan to India.
Russia may not want to reduce its levers in Afghanistan, influencing events and behaviours of stakeholders through its proxy (Unless Moscow extracts a huge concession in exchange from the US). The hypothetical chain effects would lead to realignment of tactical and strategic alliance of Central Asian states.
India’s role in Afghanistan have become very much important: its influence is vast and has spent billions of dollars in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Being a regional power, India was outmanoeuvred in Afghanistan by Pakistan in 80s and 90s. During this period, India found itself dis-invested to the detriment of its short and long term interest in Afghanistan.
The overriding interest of India is its ultimate hope to get access to Central Asia’s energy reservoirs. India’s demand for energy is increasing tremendously so is its ever stronger quest to find alternative means of energy supply. Afghanistan is the best corridor to supply gas and oil pipeline connecting central Asia with India. Though Pakistan prevents the use of its territory as transit route for New Delhi at the moment, India has a choice to approach to Central Asia through Iranian territory by-passing Pakistan.
It would not want to be seen this time losing to the contesting influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Delhi though from security point of view, is more on the debit side than Pakistan which is more security invested in Afghanistan with a nearly 30 years of vast experience of proxy effort. Indian policy makers are urging New Delhi to match Pakistan’s influence in developing a proxy infrastructure. However, India has one big disadvantage compared to Pakistan: it does not have geographical proximity with Afghanistan. Thus New Delhi is not in an envious position to create proxy infrastructure.
However, it is Pakistan that is poised to gain more from its vast network of infrastructure in the region, following the withdrawal of the US forces in Afghanistan. The United States seems to have recognised the fact that any post US dispensation in Afghanistan has to take into account Pakistan’s strategic interest. Yet, it means different things to both countries.
Islamabad’s security establishment is calculating that the Taliban would have to have a greater share in the power that would ensure any future Afghan government falls within the sphere of Pakistan. Whereas the Unites States might envisage a scenario to give a small share to Taliban in the Afghan government either within the frame work of existing constitution or redefining the rules of the game.
Washington would not want to see a return of Afghanistan to Taliban’s days when regional stakeholders were alarmed at the vast influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan setting off a regional contest to ensure the survival and share of their respective proxies. This time around there will be an Afghan army most probably funded by the West mainly by the United States and may not give much levy to Pakistan as compared to the Taliban-run Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s influence will extend at least to East and South of Afghanistan.
Interestingly, despite the pressure of the United States and its NATO allies, Pakistan kept its infrastructure of proxy component of its Afghan policy knowing that it will be useful once the NATO and the US forces have left Afghanistan.
On the face of it the biggest loser will be the people of Afghanistan who would have less choice: as only to choose among proxies; Afghan government would follow second, as to its consternation, Kabul would not be able to get rid of proxies despite the backing of the sole superpower and the NATO allies.
janassakzai200@gamil.com
Over the last nine years, the US goals though have changed, however, there are fears that the post US Afghanistan will become a battle ground for the geo-political contest of regional powers. Some interests of these regional powers converge with the US long- term strategic goals while other’s do not coincide.
For example, China would like to see Afghanistan not being dominated again by fundamentalists so that they do not serve as a base for encouraging militancy and extremism in its Sinkiang province. China fears Uighur militants are operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan-- as well Central Asia-- and from there they could potentially plot and launch attacks against China. Sinkiang is an autonomous region (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) and borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India and has abundant oil reserves and is China’s largest natural gas-producing region. At least Chinese will be happy the US has done the job for them---going after headquarter of international terrorist centre in Afghanistan.
Iran wants to see the end of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban calling shots in Afghanistan and with its Shia dominated region safe and secured. In other words, Iran would like to see Shia minority in Afghanistan is not persecuted and excluded from the power sharing. For Iran the need to have a proxy useful at least in the medium terms is not going to disappear.
To the north of Afghanistan, the big giant is Russia: Russia has so much at stake in Afghanistan, its soft belly--area of influence is central Asian states that remain susceptible to Islamic extremism. As a guarantor to the security of central Asian states, Russia sees any potential spill over to this region as anathema. Hence, Moscow would like to see a semblance of stability in Afghanistan that could stop the origination of extremism.
However, the dictates of geo-political imperatives put Russia in an awkward position as well. Supposedly, post US Afghanistan turns out stable enough to become an energy corridor for supply of oil and gas resources of central Asian states linking central Asia with the South and South East Asia, it would compromise the Russia’s ability to remain the regional and international energy power hub meeting the needs of Europe and possibly beyond.
With alternative transit routes by-passing Russian influence is not Moscow would wish for. So Russia would lose sleep if Afghanistan offered energy transit route connecting India and China with Central Asian states. Additionally, the Taliban or insurgents are likely less to be lethal after the US withdrawal. Afghan army might be able to ensue the security of any possible pipeline, likening Pakistan’s Balochistan situation where there is a low level insurgency going on yet it has not threatened the existing gas supply, and at its existing level may not be able to jeopardise any potential pipeline coming from Iran en route Balochistan to India.
Russia may not want to reduce its levers in Afghanistan, influencing events and behaviours of stakeholders through its proxy (Unless Moscow extracts a huge concession in exchange from the US). The hypothetical chain effects would lead to realignment of tactical and strategic alliance of Central Asian states.
India’s role in Afghanistan have become very much important: its influence is vast and has spent billions of dollars in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Being a regional power, India was outmanoeuvred in Afghanistan by Pakistan in 80s and 90s. During this period, India found itself dis-invested to the detriment of its short and long term interest in Afghanistan.
The overriding interest of India is its ultimate hope to get access to Central Asia’s energy reservoirs. India’s demand for energy is increasing tremendously so is its ever stronger quest to find alternative means of energy supply. Afghanistan is the best corridor to supply gas and oil pipeline connecting central Asia with India. Though Pakistan prevents the use of its territory as transit route for New Delhi at the moment, India has a choice to approach to Central Asia through Iranian territory by-passing Pakistan.
It would not want to be seen this time losing to the contesting influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Delhi though from security point of view, is more on the debit side than Pakistan which is more security invested in Afghanistan with a nearly 30 years of vast experience of proxy effort. Indian policy makers are urging New Delhi to match Pakistan’s influence in developing a proxy infrastructure. However, India has one big disadvantage compared to Pakistan: it does not have geographical proximity with Afghanistan. Thus New Delhi is not in an envious position to create proxy infrastructure.
However, it is Pakistan that is poised to gain more from its vast network of infrastructure in the region, following the withdrawal of the US forces in Afghanistan. The United States seems to have recognised the fact that any post US dispensation in Afghanistan has to take into account Pakistan’s strategic interest. Yet, it means different things to both countries.
Islamabad’s security establishment is calculating that the Taliban would have to have a greater share in the power that would ensure any future Afghan government falls within the sphere of Pakistan. Whereas the Unites States might envisage a scenario to give a small share to Taliban in the Afghan government either within the frame work of existing constitution or redefining the rules of the game.
Washington would not want to see a return of Afghanistan to Taliban’s days when regional stakeholders were alarmed at the vast influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan setting off a regional contest to ensure the survival and share of their respective proxies. This time around there will be an Afghan army most probably funded by the West mainly by the United States and may not give much levy to Pakistan as compared to the Taliban-run Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s influence will extend at least to East and South of Afghanistan.
Interestingly, despite the pressure of the United States and its NATO allies, Pakistan kept its infrastructure of proxy component of its Afghan policy knowing that it will be useful once the NATO and the US forces have left Afghanistan.
On the face of it the biggest loser will be the people of Afghanistan who would have less choice: as only to choose among proxies; Afghan government would follow second, as to its consternation, Kabul would not be able to get rid of proxies despite the backing of the sole superpower and the NATO allies.
janassakzai200@gamil.com
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