Pakistan accepts Karzai as post-US Afghan leader? By Jan Assakzai

(The Frontier Post July 20)

Pakistan has not been a great admirer of President Karzai during most of his two tenures as President of Afghanistan. Of late, Pakistan seems to have increased coordination with Karzai. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the head of the Pakistani army, and Inter-Services Intellgence (ISI) agency chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha have regularly been visiting Kabul and reportedly met with Karzai in the last couple of weeks. They visited Kabul again on June 28. Since Pakistan’s strategic policies on Afghanistan have largely been shaped by the army establishment, is the  establishment  ready to accept Karzai as some one who Pakistan can do business with in the post-US Afghanistan? There appears to be many reasons which have left Pakistan with little choice but to work with Karzai and accept him in his place possibly after the US forces have long gone from Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to see its backed Taliban co-opted as well in any possible government. Pakistan has been pursuing dual policy on Afghanistan: on one hand it has supported the US war on terror containing the al-Qaeda and Taliban, on the other, it has allowed sanctuary to “friendly” Taliban in FATA and northern Balochistan. In the meanwhile, the US strategy in Afghanistan so far is intractable with little prospects for success. The Taliban insurgency is far from over, the perception among the Taliban, Pakistan, within NATO allies is that the US and NATO is not winning in Afghanistan. A political settlement to insurgency has become more urgent to the US goal of withdrawing its forces by 2011. Hence the role of Pakistan is crucial in diffusing the insurgency for three reasons: First, the unmanned entry points of Pakistan-Afghanistan border help sustain sanctuary for the Taliban to rest, regroup, and re-supply, Only Islamabad can deny Taliban the sanctuary that will remove the most important equation sustaining the Taliban insurgency so far. Second, Pakistan has close relations with the elements of the Taliban like Haqqani network who could become party to any coalition government in Kabul. Islamabad is also the only country that has linguistic and intelligence assets in the Taliban rank so it has a better understanding than the US or Karzai government about the strategy and tactics of the Taliban. Most importantly, the forced June 6 resignations of Afghan Interior Minister Mohammed Hanif Atmar (a former Marxist and spy during the Soviet days) and National Directorate of Security chief Amrullah Saleh (a Tajik and former commander in the Northern Alliance) removed two key opponents of closer relations between Kabul and Islamabad and of negotiations with the Taliban. As a result Pakistan found itself one step closer to Karzai on June 6. But Islamabad this time does not seem to be over ambitious in imposing a reality of its own. The strategic engagement of the US in Afghanistan even after its withdrawal and self-interest of India, Iran and Russia are unlikely to allow the return of the Taliban rule Pakistan helped pull off in 1994. Third, Islamabad has also borne the brunt of its cold war policy of using the Taliban-only option as foreign policy tool to project its power in Afghanistan: in the process it lost the control of (TTP) which has turned against its own mentor at the behest of transnational organisation like al-Qaeda. The lesson Pakistan would have drawn is that it may not want to see an overwhelming domination of Taliban as well. In other words, the Taliban part of Afghan government but not sufficiently dominating the government to avoid giving in to the al-Qaeda again. These lessons might have added to Pakistan’s thinking in accepting Karzai in his place in the post-US Afghanistan hence Increasing interactions with him. If this is an accurate reflection of Pakistan’s thinking on Karzai, it will be indicative of a shift in Pakistani establishment’s policy which has till recently been only using the conservative Pakhtun Taliban as levers in Afghanistan. Through possible leverage over moderate Pakhtun leaders like Karzai, the establishment might be thinking of achieving a partial realisation of its “strategic depth” goal in Afghanistan if not a complete one. Seen in this context, Pakistan and President Karzai are on the same page vis-a-vis the Haqqni network. Karzai is an experienced politician. He has already seen the US diverging the fight against al-Qaeda from the fight against the Taliban over the last year or so and he also knows that the surge of the US and NATO forces are going to decline sooner rather than later. This is why he tried to reach out to the Taliban on his own first. But the arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar earlier in the year was likely a signal to Kabul that Pakistan’s interest have to be taken on board in any negotiations. Baradar is believed to be a top commander of Mullah Mohammad Omar and was reportedly acting as an intermediary between Mullah Omar and Karzai. This arrest helped Karzai turn to Pakistan for its support in sorting out the reconcilable elements. But, Pakistan’s increased interactions with Karzai are fraught with problems as well. In Afghanistan, many Afghans blame Pakistan’s proxy wars as the major factor for their miseries and hardship. Afghanistan’s minorities have bitter memories of the Taliban. Hence co-opting of senior Taliban and conceding greater influence over the polity of Afghanistan will cause weariness among them. Pakistan’s any new understanding with Karzai will also drive a wedge between Karzai and his allies. Besides, the Russians and Iranians will also be closely monitoring what transpires between Islamabad and Karzai, as both countries have vital self-interest in Afghanistan and would be positioning hard to check any significant accommodation of the Taliban who they have no leverage over. Though Russians may seek to accommodate the US in Afghanistan for exchange of support for its modernisation programme - important phase in Russia’s economic transformation. But Iran’s role is uncertain given its rivalry with the US. Though the outcome of Pakistan’s increased interaction with Karzai and “friendly” Taliban is not clear, Islamabad’s acceptance of Karzai as main player in future set up has underscored Pakistan’s effort in reaching out to more moderate centre-left Pakhtun leadership in Afghanistan, besides the Taliban. janassakzai200@gmail.com