Pakhtuns as ‘people vs citizens' debate: By Jan Assakzai

(The Frontier Post July 15)

There has been a debate going on among Pakhtuns of various regions including Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Diaspora. That is very black and white and divisive forcing them to identify themselves with either nation state: Pakistan or Afghanistan. Peoplehood and support of nation states: Pakistan or Afghanistan or both are two major values of the diverse Pakhtun community. But they are in direct conflict, both in principle and in practice. In principle, the values of peoplehood and support for a nation state are on a natural collision course. Peoplehood — the notion that we are all united purely by dint of being members of the Pakhtun people — does not have a geographic or ideological centre. It does not have a particular end in mind, except more peoplehood and more continuity and more well being of the community. And it has very little actual content. This, as I’ve explored in these pages, is both its great strength, as it unites everybody, and its potential great weakness, since it is low on direction and inspiration. Support for Pakistan or Afghanistan or both as Pakhtun citizens, in contrast, has a geographic and ideological centre. It does have a particular purpose. And it has a great deal of actual content, which we argue about all the time: How Pakhtun should the “Pakhtun state” be? How democratic? How secure? How just? How much dominated by Pakhtuns? We can argue about it because there is something there to argue about. As such, the trajectories of peoplehood and support for a nation state often diverge. And as we have seen lately, in practice, this divergence is actual, not theoretical. One of the values of peoplehood is inclusion: creating a Pakhtun community where participation is open to people of different generations, gender orientations, different nationalities, different levels of education and so forth. But if we want a community that stands for something — for example, support for the existence of the State of Pakistan or Afghanistan or both — then we are by definition excluding those who do not share that value. As it just class Pakhtuns whether they are “black and white” Pakhtuns by the definition of nation state. But now diaspora Pakhtuns might have another allegiance to nation state that is not Pakistan or Afghanistan but their exsiting countries they are living in. The second and third generation of Pakhtuns there will adopt the ways and values of the host nation sates they live in so they cannot be expected to be loyal to either Pakistan or Afghanistan. But they are are still Pakhtuns and are proud of their origin and history and would not want to be assimilated the way their forefathers assimilated in India. You may like them to be “black and white Pakhtuns/Afghan” or Pakistanis. This may be the right decision to you , but let’s be clear that it is a decision. Does the Pakhtun community (as represented by its various social and political entities, intelligentsia, mosques, Hujjrah and other) want to include them? Or does the community want to say that their opinions are too far beyond the pale of where we are as a community? These are two different, valid and competing values: inclusion on the one hand, support for nation state on the other. Of course, this principled conflict begs the question of who calls the shots — that is, who the “we” is. Who determines what the “Pakhtun community” stands for? We don’t actually take a vote of everyone who identifies as Pakhtun, right? In practice, we heavily weight the votes of those who affiliate more, organize more and, of course, express more their voices. This, too, may be the right decision: Without them Pakhtun institutions would not exist, and so it makes perfect sense to care more about what they think than about what some vaguely disaffected average Pakhtun on the street thinks. But let’s be clear that this prioritisation is also a de facto decision. Once again, this makes plenty of sense. Consider the Pakhtuns who advocate that Pakthuns of Pakistan should join Afghanistan. Or Pakhtuns in Pakistan may think that practically it may not be feasible to draw borders afresh hence let us not waste time on rectifying colonial anomalies. Yet we could be one community. The point, however, is not that such decisions are right or wrong, entitled or not — only that they are diametrically opposed to the promotion of Pakhtun peoplehood. They choose the value of supporting Pakistan vs Afghanistan or vice versa over the value of including all Pakhtuns in participation in the organised Pakhtun community. Though this may seem obvious, it clearly isn’t, judging by the way this intra-communal conflict has played out on the ground. For example, I recently read some debates on websites and blogs of Pakhtun community. I felt that there was less space to address two kinds of alienation: that felt by critics (mostly from Afghanistan who believe Pakhtuns in Pakistan are not enough Afghans) who feel unsafe expressing their views in the Pakhtun community, and the one experienced by most Pakhtuns (in Pakistan who believe that they happen to be in Pakistan by virtue of nation state) who feel unsafe expressing their views in the diaspora Pakhtun community mainly comprising Pakhtuns / Afghan from Afghanistan. It clearly is a big deal, because it’s got people running scared in a way that I’ve never experienced in 20 years of my Pakhtun professional life. In a way, the choice between inclusion of all Pakhtun people and shared communal values is a very old one. Long ago, our community leaders decided that Pakhtuns are one community regardless of whether they live in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, UK or the US. And that they should not confine themselves to the “black and white” debate of which nation state they should join. As they can not make these choices and cannot wish away nation state boundaries. But it does not mean they cannot contribute to the welfare of the community at large. Despite in different nation state, they have some common problems that can be resolved by a common struggle. So Pakhtun community should be inclusive in nature rather exclusive. With increasing level of education, and social mobility among the Pakhtuns we will be witnessing many new trends inside the community. We would be seeing both the rise of moderate groups and a hardening of conservative positions. So it will no longer be a big deal to express views (for example) like one will be pro-Afghanistan, a pro- Pakistan. But to express such views openly should not get you abused or shunned by fellow Pakhtuns. So there is much that is old, and much that is new, in our historical moment. The stakes should be clear. If “we” as a community are committed to support the welfare and wellbeing of Pakhtuns, then it seems right that those opposed to my views or your views should not waiver on commitment to peoplehood and inclusion. Finally, there is one other value in play: continuity. Surely it should be clear that the increasing black-or-white, with-us-or-against-us nature of Pakhtun political debate is going to be a loser for the Pakhtun people, even if it is a winner for those who do not want to see a thriving Pakhtun community. If we present younger, less-affiliated younger generation with a black-or-white choice, either for us or against us, they’re going to choose against us, no matter how many songs or records you play for them. Yes, some percentage will go south and will have exclusionist ideas. But my bet is that more of those who find themselves on the fence, if we build that fence higher, will topple over to the other side. If that is true, then the “for us or against us” crowd is harming Pakhtuns’ interests in the long run, too. Because while the Pakhtun community may be tighter, more unified and more supportive as a result of excluding those whose views are too “terrifying”, one thing is for sure: It will definitely be smaller. Thus whatever the political disagreements are among the Pakhtuns, they need to be resolved through debate and consensus as much has changed over the last decades. Only reinforcing stereotypes against each other will only undermine the strength that we can gain as a community provided we have single commitment to peoplehood. The way forward is: We have a fight at our hand that is to try to improve the lot of the community on either side politically, economically and socially (if possible) and for that fight (first) the means are not guns but education/pen, blogs, media, lobbying, demonstrations, sit-in, vigils, gatherings at mosque, Hujjrah, etc. Second, we have to work within our own resources, skills and circumstances while supplementing each others in whichever way possible.  janassakzai200@gmail.com