Limited prospects: By Jan Assakzai

(The Friday Times, July 2-8)

Gen McChrystal provided an opportunity for President Obama to turn his back, once again, on the effectiveness of the war strategy

 The commander of US Forces-Afghanistan and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force General Stanley McChrystal apparently left President Obama little choice after making blatantly critical remarks about senior administration officials in an inflammatory Rolling Stone magazine interview.

The departure of Gen McChrystal is unlikely to affect the US withdrawal timetable in Afghanistan. In any case, Washington seeks to extricate itself from Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as it can to restore its strategic “reserves”.

US watchers do not believe that President Obama’s decision to remove Gen McChrystal and replace him with Gen David Petraeus was an overnight one, the US Central Command Chief who conceived, formulated and executed the current strategy in Afghanistan. After all, Gen McChrystal also subscribed to the same strategy.

The underlying issue is that the US-led effort in Afghanistan has limited prospects for success. Gen McChrystal’s comments simply provided an opportunity for President Obama to turn his back once again on the prosecution of the war, and the effectiveness of the strategy guiding that effort.

The concept was to establish security while winning over the population, and then quickly and aggressively establish basic governance, civil authority and development projects. As in Iraq, it did not seek to impose a military reality, but to create pockets of security to facilitate political reconciliation.

However, the Marja operation seriously questioned the implementation of this policy. Marja became what Gen McChrystal called a “living ulcer”. The Americans could not easily undermine the Taliban’s operational ability or carve out security pockets and failed to move to civil governance as envisaged.

The delay of the long-anticipated Kandahar offensive also came in on the heels of other strategic lessons learned from the Marja experience. It raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police and their ability to take on additional responsibility.

Gen McChrystal’s resignation came at a time when the Taliban perceived themselves as victorious. Perceptions are growing within the West, and Afghanistan’s neighbours that NATO is losing the war, whereas Afghans remain deeply sceptical of the US commitment to Afghanistan.

Another blow came in the shape of the US programme contracting out more than 70 percent of logistics to Afghan trucking companies. It is seen to be funding both warlord militias independent of the Afghan security forces, and indirectly the Taliban. It also risks undermining the attempt to establish good governance and civil authority central to the ultimate success of the US exit strategy, in addition to bolstering the Taliban’s resources and support bases.

The lack of a decisive success and the delay of the Kandahar security offensive means perceptions are shifting in the Taliban’s favour, casting a big question mark on the prospects of success of the US and its allies. The war of perceptions in Afghanistan is critical, where the US and NATO have ambitious goals but tight time tables.

Intelligence has been at the heart of the US challenges in Afghanistan, a fact that was clear from the beginning of the strategy. But slower progress in Marja and the Kandahar offensive has raised serious questions about the accuracy of US intelligence and the mismatch between the local perceptions of the people and US strategy. Security is proving elusive and the population does not appear to be willing to join the side of the Afghan government yet, due to fear and intimidation of the Taliban.

With the elusive progress in southern Afghanistan, political settlement is becoming an increasingly central component of the exit strategy. This is the US State Department’s main focus, and there appears to be considerable US support behind Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s reconciliation efforts.

The Taliban are very aware of the tight US timetable. They appear to be maintaining a significant degree of internal discipline and have not let the US block reconcilable elements, as the Americans had originally hoped.

To the dismay of President Karzai, Gen McChrystal was a loyal commander and Karzai now has to work with his replacement and create new understandings. For Pakistan’s Army Chief Gen Kayani, the resignation of Gen McChrystal serves as another moment for glee. Gen Kayani knows that the US cannot manage a graceful exit from Afghanistan without the active cooperation of Pakistan Army. Ultimately, unmanned border crossing points between Pakistan and Afghanistan mean the Taliban insurgency across the border can not be diffused without denying sanctuary that enables them to regroup, re-arm and resupply.

Gen McCrystal’s unceremonious departure drove home the message for President Obama that ultimately the strategy Washington selected to achieve demonstrable results quickly is flawed. The Afghans may not be entirely uninterested in coalition offers, but the socio-political alternative that Washington is offering is simply not compelling. Any adjustment to the US strategy at this late stage will simply reinforce the perception that the US and NATO are not winning.
Jan Assakzai is a London-based analyst and can be contacted at: janassakzai200@gmail.com