Thaw in Pakistan-India relations is fragile- By Jan Assakzai

(The Frontier Post)

India and Pakistan’s foreign secretaries held talks (June 24) to apparently set the tone for the meeting of the foreign minsters of the two countries on July 15. Yet these talks were significant. This is the beginning of a hopefully a lengthy peace negotiations between the two countries. The process comes on the back of Pakistan and the United State’s realignment on Afghanistan and the apparent failure of India to force Islamabad to wind up militant infrastructure in the wake of Mumbai attacks in 2008. India and the US had realigned after Sept 11 attacks in a bid to pressure Islamabad to stop the use of proxies in India and Afghanistan as a foreign policy tool. Of late, New Delhi, however, sensed a new understanding between Pakistan and the US on Islamabad’s possible role in Afghanistan, and felt isolated on the militancy issue—- the prime concern for India in its relations with Pakistan. It decided to directly engage Pakistan to make sure all its huge investment made in Afghanistan is not lost. The new round of talks were held in a different environment though. Pakistan has conducted military operations against militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. The establishment is under pressure to extend the scope of operations to those militants based in Punjab. So far, except the right wing PML(N) and pro-militant religious parities, almost all major political forces, and other pillars of the society have demanded action against these networks in Punjab. There is growing realisation in different segments of Pakistani society as well about the dangers of militant infrastructure it poses to the internal security of the country. The establishment while responding to the pressure has apparently sought to “manage” these militants in Punjab for the time being. The strategy involves the leaders of these militants who would be approached and made responsible for controlling their “operatives”. However, its effectiveness is yet to be seen.  Although India continued to have a sleepless nights because of militants’ threat, New Delhi this time around was more confident to use the militant insurgency to its own benefit. It knew that Pakistan is grappled with the extremists’ insurgency thus its emphasis on making progress on terrorist threat will strike a cord with many in Pakistan. But the Mumbai attacks in 2008 proved Islamabad and New Delhi’s relations are hostage to the whims of these militants. If there is another attack on the Indian soil and it is traced back to these militants, any improvement in relations between the two countries will likely come to a naught. As far as Pakistan is concerned, there is no strategic shift in the establishment’s thinking vis-a-vis using proxies as a tool despite the pressure from civilian institutions. But the belligerent insurgency which is threatening to spread to other parts of the country including Punjab has seriously challenged the effectiveness of this strategy. With their mentor al-Qaeda as part of the equation, these outfits are prone to let loose from the control of the agencies as is the case with the TTP. Islamabad is now extremely finding hard to keep a lid on the groups it has lost control of. For the US, its traditional stance on Pakistan and India relations remains the same: both countries should resolve all outstanding issues bilaterally. But it’s foremost concern now is the 2011 draw down deadline. It needs the support of Islamabad and thus has sought to put some pressure on India not to distract Islamabad from helping out Washington in Afghanistan. From cynics’ point of view, the US may find itself content with some form of militancy in Pakistan (in the long run) so long as it does not directly threaten the US homeland security. This approach suites Washington’s interest well: it can extract concessions from India by waving Pakistani levers. While it can also force Islamabad to yield to its areas of concern by tempting to pull Indian levers. For the time being the US may want to give a window of opportunity to Islamabad to get used to a reduced pressure from India. Whereas Pakistan’s establishment is facing a dilemma: it has to balance the desire to improve relations with India with its quest to contain New Delhi’s military strength by using proxy—- the only way Islamabad seems to think it can counter balance India’s huge military superiority. The thaw in relations between India and Pakistan is fragile and easily reversible though. janassakzai200@gamil.com