Khyber Pakhtunkhwa facing economic ruin
The Frontier Post
Jan Assakzai
The Federal government has failed to offset the financial losses of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA incurred due to militancy raging in the region of eight to ten billion US dollars thus raising the specter of near economic collapse of the province. The proposed budget for 2010-11 only promise nearly 1.5 billion US dollars - a fraction of the actual losses of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s strategic location as next to the epicentre of al-Qaeda and its allies in FATA helped fuel its near economic collapse and, has continued to dictate Pakistan and the US poorly executed responses.
The sometimes competing US and Pakistan’s policies were both ill-defined and out of touch with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s social reality. Pakistan’s belated intervention to turn the tide of Taliban failed to create the conditions necessary for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s economic and social recovery.
According to Chamber of Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, out of a total of 1600 industrial units operating in 2007, only about 542 units were left today. The rest of the units were closed down incurring nearly Rs 70 billion worth losses to the province and rendering 57,000 people unemployed.
The Federal government’s promise to help rehabilitate the IDPs of Swat following military operation did not fully materialise. In the province the number of IDPs are around half a million. While the number of those IDPs who have not been officially designated as IDPs, could be running in hundreds of thousands as well.
Most Pakhtuns had viewed the Pakistani military operations and US drone attacks with high hopes that they would remove militancy, break the neck of al-Qaeda and relieve the economic burden as a result. But after nearly seven years, their hardships are far from over due to entrenched militant landscape.
However, the economic collapse that ensued in FATA region is unparalleled. According to the Chamber of Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, traditional industries of marble and plastic simply were closed down. But while humanitarian disaster in terms of IDPs was averted, the political and economic roots of the crisis remained unresolved.
Pakistan’s differentiation policy: targeting Taliban that fight Pakistan and leaving militants that fight in Afghanistan left the militants infrastructure intact in FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa even today.
The US commanders and political leaders’ insistence on dealing only with military and political leaders in Islamabad rather than crucial voices of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s beleaguered civil society served to undermine local efforts toward humanitarian reconstruction and normalization of life.
Following decades during which Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA was over-armed by Pakistan and the US for their proxy wars in Afghanistan, the US intervention in terms of drone attacks though, eliminated some of the hard core of al-Qaeda militants, served to exacerbate existing difficulties of the people of FATA, by default, indirectly further empowering the already strong militant leaders in the region.
In the years of militancy, countless tribal leaders, political workers, aid workers and women and children have lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands are either internally displaced or forced to seek refuge in other parts of Pakistan. Despite military operations in Swat and Malakand, situation in most of Khyber Pakhtunkwah is far from stable. With the rise of Pakistan Tehrik Taliban, the province has suffered numerous attacks of suicide bombing and explosions.
Washington seems to have accepted and perpetuated the stereotype that local culture in Khyber Pakhtunkwa is the cause of Talibanisation. By ignoring or underplaying that the roots of the instability — a battleground for geo-political influence in Afghanistan and an economic collapse following superpower abandonment in the wake of al -Qaeda’s transition to FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — the US not only distorts Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s history but also absolves itself of any responsibility for the crisis.
The much talked about ROZs have still not been through the United States Senate. But its future already seems to be bleak. According to the Chamber of Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a textile industry would cost nearly one billion rupees to set up while those industries set up under similar programmes in Syria and Jordan cost less.
Militancy , poverty and unemployment will continue as long as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa does not receive appropriate Federal government and international support for local agriculture and other sustainable development measures.
Meanwhile, the geo-political battle of Pakistan in Afghanistan - a cold war legacy - and of underdevelopment and oversupply of unemployed youth will continue to feed the militants’ battles posing threat not only to the country but also to the rest of world, including the United States.
However, in terms of concrete policy changes, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government’s efforts are unlikely to affect much - province’s policy options are highly constrained by geographical, demographic, economic and security factors. janassakzai200@gmail.com
The Federal government has failed to offset the financial losses of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA incurred due to militancy raging in the region of eight to ten billion US dollars thus raising the specter of near economic collapse of the province. The proposed budget for 2010-11 only promise nearly 1.5 billion US dollars - a fraction of the actual losses of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s strategic location as next to the epicentre of al-Qaeda and its allies in FATA helped fuel its near economic collapse and, has continued to dictate Pakistan and the US poorly executed responses.
The sometimes competing US and Pakistan’s policies were both ill-defined and out of touch with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s social reality. Pakistan’s belated intervention to turn the tide of Taliban failed to create the conditions necessary for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s economic and social recovery.
According to Chamber of Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, out of a total of 1600 industrial units operating in 2007, only about 542 units were left today. The rest of the units were closed down incurring nearly Rs 70 billion worth losses to the province and rendering 57,000 people unemployed.
The Federal government’s promise to help rehabilitate the IDPs of Swat following military operation did not fully materialise. In the province the number of IDPs are around half a million. While the number of those IDPs who have not been officially designated as IDPs, could be running in hundreds of thousands as well.
Most Pakhtuns had viewed the Pakistani military operations and US drone attacks with high hopes that they would remove militancy, break the neck of al-Qaeda and relieve the economic burden as a result. But after nearly seven years, their hardships are far from over due to entrenched militant landscape.
However, the economic collapse that ensued in FATA region is unparalleled. According to the Chamber of Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, traditional industries of marble and plastic simply were closed down. But while humanitarian disaster in terms of IDPs was averted, the political and economic roots of the crisis remained unresolved.
Pakistan’s differentiation policy: targeting Taliban that fight Pakistan and leaving militants that fight in Afghanistan left the militants infrastructure intact in FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa even today.
The US commanders and political leaders’ insistence on dealing only with military and political leaders in Islamabad rather than crucial voices of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s beleaguered civil society served to undermine local efforts toward humanitarian reconstruction and normalization of life.
Following decades during which Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA was over-armed by Pakistan and the US for their proxy wars in Afghanistan, the US intervention in terms of drone attacks though, eliminated some of the hard core of al-Qaeda militants, served to exacerbate existing difficulties of the people of FATA, by default, indirectly further empowering the already strong militant leaders in the region.
In the years of militancy, countless tribal leaders, political workers, aid workers and women and children have lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands are either internally displaced or forced to seek refuge in other parts of Pakistan. Despite military operations in Swat and Malakand, situation in most of Khyber Pakhtunkwah is far from stable. With the rise of Pakistan Tehrik Taliban, the province has suffered numerous attacks of suicide bombing and explosions.
Washington seems to have accepted and perpetuated the stereotype that local culture in Khyber Pakhtunkwa is the cause of Talibanisation. By ignoring or underplaying that the roots of the instability — a battleground for geo-political influence in Afghanistan and an economic collapse following superpower abandonment in the wake of al -Qaeda’s transition to FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — the US not only distorts Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s history but also absolves itself of any responsibility for the crisis.
The much talked about ROZs have still not been through the United States Senate. But its future already seems to be bleak. According to the Chamber of Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a textile industry would cost nearly one billion rupees to set up while those industries set up under similar programmes in Syria and Jordan cost less.
Militancy , poverty and unemployment will continue as long as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa does not receive appropriate Federal government and international support for local agriculture and other sustainable development measures.
Meanwhile, the geo-political battle of Pakistan in Afghanistan - a cold war legacy - and of underdevelopment and oversupply of unemployed youth will continue to feed the militants’ battles posing threat not only to the country but also to the rest of world, including the United States.
However, in terms of concrete policy changes, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government’s efforts are unlikely to affect much - province’s policy options are highly constrained by geographical, demographic, economic and security factors. janassakzai200@gmail.com
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