Is MMA’s revival a mischief?
Jan Assakzai The media has rumoured of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, the chief of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) that he is making efforts to revive the defunct MMA. The JUI (F) is also said to have developed serious differences with the current coalition government and is contemplating of quitting the Federal government. The question arises as to why the MMA is trying to revive alliance. Is it a simple act of real politicking or is part of grand strategy given its past links with establishment?
The problem with the revival of the MMA at this stage does not explain the timing. The MMA which came to power on various times was because it had the support of the establishment. The MMA emerged on the heel of major changes in the geo-political landscape of the region. In Afghanistan, the pro-Moscow government in Kabul was facing an imminent collapse following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan became arena for geo-political contest for its powerful neighbours, including Pakistan. The then chief of Army Staff Gen Mirza Aslam Baig’s vision was to shape the political landscape in Pakistan in a manner that was conducive to Islamabad’s efforts to ensure a “friendly” government in Kabul. So two-pronged strategy was adopted.
First, amidst the fallout of the plane crash of Gen Zia ul Haq, Pakistan could not see continuation of direct army rule tenable. Hence a “democratic” cloth was needed to wrap around the face of the new political set-up with the Army calling the shorts in the background.
To this end, PPP was to be contained as number one priority. Second, in the north west close to the border region, establishment of pro- jihadi political force smoothing things over for Pakistan in its efforts to monopolise events in Afghanistan, became the number two priority of Gen Baig’s strategy. The practical equivalent of this thinking was the MMA.
Of late, Pakistan managed to install a proxy Mujahideen government in Kabul thus strategically dominating the whole of Afghanistan. It is a matter of record that Gen Baig distributed money among the pro-establishment politicians in the whole country to ensure MMA’s victory in the elections.
The two important political parties, the JUI(F) and the JI, were directly helping the establishment in its proxy wars in Afghanistan and India, respectively, acting as its political extension. The JUI( F) and the JI have been on the forefront in supporting the Mujahideen and the Taliban in Afghanistan. They would organise rallies, raise funds, help recruit fighters, and justify the holy war with fatwas. Once Mujahideen fell off with the establishment due to internal strife, the Taliban were introduced to the equation.
Fast forward the history, with most of Afghanistan subsequently under the direct control of the Taliban, stage was set for Talibanisation of Pakistan’s Pakhtun areas. The impression the West in particularly got was that Pakhtuns are equivalent to extremism and Talibanistion. The 1990 elections and subsequent polls were rigged to ensure victory of the MMA in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern Balochistan particularly ramming home the message that Pakhtuns wanted a religious political alliance and were angry with the Western policies while supporting the Mujahiedeen and later the Taliban in Afghanistan.
However, the reality was far from this perception: for the first time when elections in 2008 were held, the MMA failed to win. The main reason was that polls were not as engineered as in the past. Thus a new breed of Pakhtun political actors - nationalist ANP and PPP - came to power. This challenged the theory that Pakhtuns were pro-Taliban and prone to extremist forces.
Notwithstanding, no questions were asked from Gen Baig and his other fellow Generals as to why they imposed fake leadership on Pakhtun areas by frequently rigging the elections. One possible explanation could be: for the rest of the country, it was OK as events in the north of Indus Basin - Pakhtun buffer territories - were related with the security and interest (strategic depth) of the hinterland: east of the Indus Basin hence could be manipulated at the whims of few ambitious generals, and deemed fit even if that meant disfranchising millions of Pakhtuns. Such a mockery of democracy was unparalleled.
The JUI (F) and the JI now seem to have some disagreement with the establishment on certain issues: for example, the JUI (F) is uncomfortable with army operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and has offered on several occasions to mediate between the Taliban and the Army so is the case with the JI.
Media has rumoured of Moulana Fazlur Rahman that he offered even fatehas for the death of militants killed during the operations. The JUI(F) and the JI have qualms about calling the soldiers killed in action as martyrs, while refusing to term Baitullah Mehsood as terrorist.
However, one needs not to exaggerate the differences of the MMA with the establishment. They still believe that Afghan Taliban - Pakistan’s proxy arm in Afghanistan - should hold the power in Kabul. Its supporters and sympathiser are believed to be helping Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in hiding, recruiting, and financing in various parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Northern Balochistan.
The JUI(F) is a staunch supporter of Afghan Taliban as they belonged to the same Deobandi School of thought. Ideologically, they support al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda though it may be another thing that both parties have no intent for any transnational attacks. But their support for al-Qaeda and Indian-specific militants might inspire a lone wolf jihadists to mount transnational attack given the diverse diaspora Pakistani community in Gulf, Europe and North America.
At time when the overwhelming majority of Pakhtuns in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are seeking the army’s help to get rid of these foreign terrorists and their Taliban allies, the JUI(F) and the JI could not condemn the suicide attacks and killing of innocent people.
On the other hand, the MMA opponents, particularly Pakhtun nationalist forces, might have already grown suspicious of the establishment’s perceived or real attempt to bolster ties and re-engage with these religio-political parties.
In the backdrop of the US draw down time table, Pakistan has realigned with the US on Afghanistan and Islamabad expects its leverage over Taliban means, its interest would be accommodated. It is, therefore, not far fetched that the MMA might be needed again to reduce any “trust deficit” between Afghan Taliban and the establishment.
The nationalist forces could still be fuming over patronizing of MMA by the establishment in the past. The MMA is by no means the only area of concern for the nationalists vis a vis the establishment at present. Aside from the ongoing disagreement over the fate of FATA reforms, differentiation policy of the establishment towards the Taliban militants, and IDPs’ rehabilitation, has assumed the potential to deepen strains between Pakhtun nationalist forces and the establishment.
Just as the ANP had begun speaking more confidently about gaining army’s support for the military operations against the militants, a new concern over the treatment of Pakhtuns in Karachi at the hands of MQM seems to have emerged.
More importantly, any perceived or real support for the MMA by the establishment would certainly deepen strains between the nationalists and the establishment.
Of course, neither the Pakhtun nationalist forces nor the establishment is eager to break free from the usual ups and downs that define their differences on issues like Afghanistan, perceptions on al-Qaeda vs Indian threat and spy agencies’ interference in politics, the last thing either side - or the rest of the Pakhtuns , for that matter - needs is a rapture in the former’s support for the latter’s efforts in wiping out militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, and evaporation of goodwill of the Pakhtuns for the army in ridding them of Taliban militants in areas like Swat, Dir, South Waziristan and now Orakzai.
janassakzai200@gmail.com (The Frontier Post June 8, 2010)
The problem with the revival of the MMA at this stage does not explain the timing. The MMA which came to power on various times was because it had the support of the establishment. The MMA emerged on the heel of major changes in the geo-political landscape of the region. In Afghanistan, the pro-Moscow government in Kabul was facing an imminent collapse following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan became arena for geo-political contest for its powerful neighbours, including Pakistan. The then chief of Army Staff Gen Mirza Aslam Baig’s vision was to shape the political landscape in Pakistan in a manner that was conducive to Islamabad’s efforts to ensure a “friendly” government in Kabul. So two-pronged strategy was adopted.
First, amidst the fallout of the plane crash of Gen Zia ul Haq, Pakistan could not see continuation of direct army rule tenable. Hence a “democratic” cloth was needed to wrap around the face of the new political set-up with the Army calling the shorts in the background.
To this end, PPP was to be contained as number one priority. Second, in the north west close to the border region, establishment of pro- jihadi political force smoothing things over for Pakistan in its efforts to monopolise events in Afghanistan, became the number two priority of Gen Baig’s strategy. The practical equivalent of this thinking was the MMA.
Of late, Pakistan managed to install a proxy Mujahideen government in Kabul thus strategically dominating the whole of Afghanistan. It is a matter of record that Gen Baig distributed money among the pro-establishment politicians in the whole country to ensure MMA’s victory in the elections.
The two important political parties, the JUI(F) and the JI, were directly helping the establishment in its proxy wars in Afghanistan and India, respectively, acting as its political extension. The JUI( F) and the JI have been on the forefront in supporting the Mujahideen and the Taliban in Afghanistan. They would organise rallies, raise funds, help recruit fighters, and justify the holy war with fatwas. Once Mujahideen fell off with the establishment due to internal strife, the Taliban were introduced to the equation.
Fast forward the history, with most of Afghanistan subsequently under the direct control of the Taliban, stage was set for Talibanisation of Pakistan’s Pakhtun areas. The impression the West in particularly got was that Pakhtuns are equivalent to extremism and Talibanistion. The 1990 elections and subsequent polls were rigged to ensure victory of the MMA in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern Balochistan particularly ramming home the message that Pakhtuns wanted a religious political alliance and were angry with the Western policies while supporting the Mujahiedeen and later the Taliban in Afghanistan.
However, the reality was far from this perception: for the first time when elections in 2008 were held, the MMA failed to win. The main reason was that polls were not as engineered as in the past. Thus a new breed of Pakhtun political actors - nationalist ANP and PPP - came to power. This challenged the theory that Pakhtuns were pro-Taliban and prone to extremist forces.
Notwithstanding, no questions were asked from Gen Baig and his other fellow Generals as to why they imposed fake leadership on Pakhtun areas by frequently rigging the elections. One possible explanation could be: for the rest of the country, it was OK as events in the north of Indus Basin - Pakhtun buffer territories - were related with the security and interest (strategic depth) of the hinterland: east of the Indus Basin hence could be manipulated at the whims of few ambitious generals, and deemed fit even if that meant disfranchising millions of Pakhtuns. Such a mockery of democracy was unparalleled.
The JUI (F) and the JI now seem to have some disagreement with the establishment on certain issues: for example, the JUI (F) is uncomfortable with army operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and has offered on several occasions to mediate between the Taliban and the Army so is the case with the JI.
Media has rumoured of Moulana Fazlur Rahman that he offered even fatehas for the death of militants killed during the operations. The JUI(F) and the JI have qualms about calling the soldiers killed in action as martyrs, while refusing to term Baitullah Mehsood as terrorist.
However, one needs not to exaggerate the differences of the MMA with the establishment. They still believe that Afghan Taliban - Pakistan’s proxy arm in Afghanistan - should hold the power in Kabul. Its supporters and sympathiser are believed to be helping Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in hiding, recruiting, and financing in various parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Northern Balochistan.
The JUI(F) is a staunch supporter of Afghan Taliban as they belonged to the same Deobandi School of thought. Ideologically, they support al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda though it may be another thing that both parties have no intent for any transnational attacks. But their support for al-Qaeda and Indian-specific militants might inspire a lone wolf jihadists to mount transnational attack given the diverse diaspora Pakistani community in Gulf, Europe and North America.
At time when the overwhelming majority of Pakhtuns in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are seeking the army’s help to get rid of these foreign terrorists and their Taliban allies, the JUI(F) and the JI could not condemn the suicide attacks and killing of innocent people.
On the other hand, the MMA opponents, particularly Pakhtun nationalist forces, might have already grown suspicious of the establishment’s perceived or real attempt to bolster ties and re-engage with these religio-political parties.
In the backdrop of the US draw down time table, Pakistan has realigned with the US on Afghanistan and Islamabad expects its leverage over Taliban means, its interest would be accommodated. It is, therefore, not far fetched that the MMA might be needed again to reduce any “trust deficit” between Afghan Taliban and the establishment.
The nationalist forces could still be fuming over patronizing of MMA by the establishment in the past. The MMA is by no means the only area of concern for the nationalists vis a vis the establishment at present. Aside from the ongoing disagreement over the fate of FATA reforms, differentiation policy of the establishment towards the Taliban militants, and IDPs’ rehabilitation, has assumed the potential to deepen strains between Pakhtun nationalist forces and the establishment.
Just as the ANP had begun speaking more confidently about gaining army’s support for the military operations against the militants, a new concern over the treatment of Pakhtuns in Karachi at the hands of MQM seems to have emerged.
More importantly, any perceived or real support for the MMA by the establishment would certainly deepen strains between the nationalists and the establishment.
Of course, neither the Pakhtun nationalist forces nor the establishment is eager to break free from the usual ups and downs that define their differences on issues like Afghanistan, perceptions on al-Qaeda vs Indian threat and spy agencies’ interference in politics, the last thing either side - or the rest of the Pakhtuns , for that matter - needs is a rapture in the former’s support for the latter’s efforts in wiping out militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, and evaporation of goodwill of the Pakhtuns for the army in ridding them of Taliban militants in areas like Swat, Dir, South Waziristan and now Orakzai.
janassakzai200@gmail.com (The Frontier Post June 8, 2010)
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