Foot dragging on North Waziristan operation worrying Pakhtuns-- Jan Assakzai
(The Frontier Post)
Different media leaks have rumored of the “intelligence officials” that the army may no take action and instead choose what they call “selective targeting”. The reports said that “some officials also believe that opening a new front against the likes of Haqqani and Gul Bahadur would make enemies out of well-trained, well-financed groups that are potentially valuable allies when US troops leave Afghanistan”
The fundamental challenges impeding the government resolve to take on the militants includes the presence of Pakistan “friendly” militant warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur- who is believed to have entered into a neutrality pact with Pakistan- and the Haqqani network -who are involved in attacks in Afghanistan- and the fear of the militants possible backlash particularly in Punjab (as many militants groups in Punjab are linked with the al Qaeda and the militant network in the Norh Waziristan) .
Complicating the picture is Pakistan’s positioning to use its influence over the Haqqni network as a highly prized bargaining chip in any possible negotiations with the US in the context of Washington’s draw down time table in 2011 and the post US Afghanistan.
However, one hopes these report are unlikely to be true. If the army in any stage intends to go after the militants, revealing the plan of not attacking could severely undermine the operation.
Furthermore, Islamabad can little afford the political blow of being seen allying with al Qaeda, and Haqqani network not only in the eyes of Washington but also of Pakhtuns who are still living under the constant threat and intimidation of militancy in their neighbourhoods, despite the crackdown on the TTP in Swat, South Waziristan and Orakzai.
Even if the leaks to the media are true, the revelation of potential to shelve the operation could very well negate its viability.
Regardless of intentions or truth, the reports certainly would encourage the TTP which is under squeeze by the army in different areas, to make its way to the North Waziristan hence likely revive its full operational capability- a nightmare scenario for Pakhtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as over ninety per cent of the TTP attacks were targeted within eighty kilo meter radius square.
The potential for the army to shelve plan of operation in North Waziristan is unlikely to be welcomed by the provincial government, democratic political forces, the media and the Pakhun civil society.
For now, it is unclear if the army , which has already in principal decided to launch an operation, can get the situation back under control in other parts of FATA without retaking the North Waziristan.
But more important, the issue has moved from being concern of American interest to concern of majority of Pakhtuns wanting a comprehensive strategy against all types of militants vs the possibility of them being used in the future in other capacities in Afghanistan.
The army has proven over the last ten or so months that it is on a path of eradicating the TTP and consolidating positions in the militants’ former strongholds e.g, Swat, South Waziristan and Orakzai — of which North Waziristan could be the toughest link in the chain to control.
If they army remains careful thus far in its decision not to stir up a larger crisis in Punjab, it may find it difficult to skirt around Pakhtuns’ uneasiness over the still thriving haven of the militants at their door step- a difficult balancing act.
With North Waziristan continues to be the last safe haven of al Qaeda and its its militant allies, Pakistan is still dragging feet to quell the militants in the North Waziristan. This has not stopped Pakhtuns from worrying that Islamabad may even reverse its decision to take action against the militants.
Different media leaks have rumored of the “intelligence officials” that the army may no take action and instead choose what they call “selective targeting”. The reports said that “some officials also believe that opening a new front against the likes of Haqqani and Gul Bahadur would make enemies out of well-trained, well-financed groups that are potentially valuable allies when US troops leave Afghanistan”
The fundamental challenges impeding the government resolve to take on the militants includes the presence of Pakistan “friendly” militant warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur- who is believed to have entered into a neutrality pact with Pakistan- and the Haqqani network -who are involved in attacks in Afghanistan- and the fear of the militants possible backlash particularly in Punjab (as many militants groups in Punjab are linked with the al Qaeda and the militant network in the Norh Waziristan) .
Complicating the picture is Pakistan’s positioning to use its influence over the Haqqni network as a highly prized bargaining chip in any possible negotiations with the US in the context of Washington’s draw down time table in 2011 and the post US Afghanistan.
However, one hopes these report are unlikely to be true. If the army in any stage intends to go after the militants, revealing the plan of not attacking could severely undermine the operation.
Furthermore, Islamabad can little afford the political blow of being seen allying with al Qaeda, and Haqqani network not only in the eyes of Washington but also of Pakhtuns who are still living under the constant threat and intimidation of militancy in their neighbourhoods, despite the crackdown on the TTP in Swat, South Waziristan and Orakzai.
Even if the leaks to the media are true, the revelation of potential to shelve the operation could very well negate its viability.
Regardless of intentions or truth, the reports certainly would encourage the TTP which is under squeeze by the army in different areas, to make its way to the North Waziristan hence likely revive its full operational capability- a nightmare scenario for Pakhtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as over ninety per cent of the TTP attacks were targeted within eighty kilo meter radius square.
The potential for the army to shelve plan of operation in North Waziristan is unlikely to be welcomed by the provincial government, democratic political forces, the media and the Pakhun civil society.
For now, it is unclear if the army , which has already in principal decided to launch an operation, can get the situation back under control in other parts of FATA without retaking the North Waziristan.
But more important, the issue has moved from being concern of American interest to concern of majority of Pakhtuns wanting a comprehensive strategy against all types of militants vs the possibility of them being used in the future in other capacities in Afghanistan.
The army has proven over the last ten or so months that it is on a path of eradicating the TTP and consolidating positions in the militants’ former strongholds e.g, Swat, South Waziristan and Orakzai — of which North Waziristan could be the toughest link in the chain to control.
If they army remains careful thus far in its decision not to stir up a larger crisis in Punjab, it may find it difficult to skirt around Pakhtuns’ uneasiness over the still thriving haven of the militants at their door step- a difficult balancing act.
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