‘Dealing’ with militants in Punjab, agencies style-Jan Assakzai
(The Frontier Post)
Media has rumoured a new strategy that security agencies want to adopt in the Punjab to “deal” with the growing threat of TTP. This strategy includes negotiations with “top leaders” of these outfits and making them responsible to control their “operatives”.
As if the attacks on two worship places of Ahmedi sect killing over 100 people, were not good enough to prove that security agencies have lost control of many splinter groups, yet these agencies are now suggesting that “the top leadership” of Punjab’s outfits are in their control (if these media leaks are accurate).
But is it a new shift in Pakistan’s thinking towards dealing with the militancy in the country or is an old ploy to stave off mounting national and international pressure. For now, the army seems to be determined in its efforts to wipe out the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of FATA despite the stiff resistance in areas like Upper Orakzai, and Mamond.
However, it has left untouched those militants who are fighting in Afghanistan. There are also militant outfits that have links to attacks in India and partly operating in tribal areas but mostly based in Punjab. Complicating the whole picture is Pakistan’ geo-political interest in Afghanistan and India that does not allow to opt for a complete sweep of militants in the country.
From the establishment’s point of view, Pakistan needs to have a leverage in Afghanistan through its “friendly Taliban” hence the militant landscape in FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remain and while militants in Punjab have mainly India-specific orientation. Secondly, Pakistan still perceives al-Qaeda and its allied militants as of lesser threat than India. For Islamabad, militants including the TTP do not pose strategic threat rather they are tactical threat: the TTP normally stage attacks at least within its operational area: between 80 to 100 kilometres - within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
These attacks do not cause the destruction of say over 1500 lives or a collapse of strategic buildings or installations, instead they focuses more or less on soft targets involving the loss of few lives and some damage. The TTP Punjab Chapter has focused on some important targets in Punjab including a recent attack on the NATO logistic depot. However, theses losses were more of tactical nature as they failed to meaningfully alter the policies of the political leadership in Punjab and the army towards militancy in the province in general.
The latest proof comes from the security agencies’ new “strategy” to bring pressure to bear on the top leadership of these outfits. But in practice it means the policy of “managing” militants instead of confronting at this moment. The army might have considered the worst case scenario while adopting this policy meaning tactical losses as a result of possible militant attacks might be within the tolerance threshold as opposed to the overall utility/value of these militants in the context of possible geo-political gains.
But the TTP Punjab Chapter is known to be allied with al-Qaeda. That means they have a powerful mentor who will help sustain the TTP ideologically, financially and operationally not only in the border region but also in the Punjab so long as Islamabad has not switched to zero tolerance policy towards all types of militants and in the process has not wiped out al-Qaeda and its allies in North Waziristan. For now they have least incentive to listen to their ex-mentors (the security agencies).
The militants landscape is complex and fluid. Once a Pakistani Taliban militant can easily join the prey across the border with their Afghan counterparts (or vice versa) or may attempt to mount or sponsor a transnational attack if he gets the ability - failed bomb attack on New York - Time Square is an example.
This makes the job of Pakistan very complicated in distinguishing friendly Taliban and rogue Taliban both in FATA/Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. The militants’ outfits have evolved into a type of movement - with weak command and control structure and least coordinated operational ability.
They have acquired the ability to be mobile so as to avoid being detected and caught by the authorities. However, since militants enjoy a breathing space in FATA, they have still some workable command and control system and on hand training facility to mount attacks in other parts of the country, including Punjab.
Some expert do not believe that the TTP is a tactical threat rather they believe it is a strategic one. Pakistan is not a western country where penetration is difficult due to visa restrictions, or has a high rate of surveillance against strategic targets and or ordinary masses are vigilant so is vulnerable to spectacular attacks on its sensitive installations and transportation centres.
The TTP’s ability to mount suicide attack is considered far superior than that of their Afghan counterparts and is likened with al-Qaeda in Iraq. One reason for this could be their direct mentoring from al-Qaeda based in their vicinity in the border region.
The TTP Punjab chapter is more dangerous: It has held India and Pakistan’s relation hostage. If another Mumbai-style attack is traced to these militants in Punjab, it will again bring the two nations on the brink of a war.
“Dealing” with the murky landscape of militancy brings many challenges of its own: the likes of Col Imam, Khalid Khwaja and Hamid Gul are living examples that where the mere tool of strategic policy in Afghanistan: Taliban, becomes the ideology of the operatives of that policy.
On the other hand, support for elements of Afghan Taliban and the militant landscape in the border region has caused enormous damage to Pakistan’s own society and undermined its writ in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA in the process. As a result inhabitants of this region -predominately Pakhtuns - are facing enormous hardships and sufferings hence feeling agitated over Pakistan’s foreign policy on Afghanistan and its strategic reluctance to turn back on militancy and infrastructure of hate and religious intolerance in the Punjab.
It is no wonder nearly half of the radicalised and agitated Pakistani society outweighs any potential strategic gains in Afghanistan. However, ultimately the TTP and other militants’ survival lies in policy makers’ choice to strategically decide whether using military thrust in Afghanistan is preferable option to the humanitarian and development push for gaining strategic leverage in that country?
At present, the establishment is unlikely to adopt zero tolerance policy towards all shades of militants and shut down the infrastructure of hate and religious intolerance in Punjab up until Islamabad’s strategic interest in Afghanistan and India is secured, regardless of the cost to Pakistan’s own society, the country and the world at large.
janassakzai200@gmail.com
Media has rumoured a new strategy that security agencies want to adopt in the Punjab to “deal” with the growing threat of TTP. This strategy includes negotiations with “top leaders” of these outfits and making them responsible to control their “operatives”.
As if the attacks on two worship places of Ahmedi sect killing over 100 people, were not good enough to prove that security agencies have lost control of many splinter groups, yet these agencies are now suggesting that “the top leadership” of Punjab’s outfits are in their control (if these media leaks are accurate).
But is it a new shift in Pakistan’s thinking towards dealing with the militancy in the country or is an old ploy to stave off mounting national and international pressure. For now, the army seems to be determined in its efforts to wipe out the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of FATA despite the stiff resistance in areas like Upper Orakzai, and Mamond.
However, it has left untouched those militants who are fighting in Afghanistan. There are also militant outfits that have links to attacks in India and partly operating in tribal areas but mostly based in Punjab. Complicating the whole picture is Pakistan’ geo-political interest in Afghanistan and India that does not allow to opt for a complete sweep of militants in the country.
From the establishment’s point of view, Pakistan needs to have a leverage in Afghanistan through its “friendly Taliban” hence the militant landscape in FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remain and while militants in Punjab have mainly India-specific orientation. Secondly, Pakistan still perceives al-Qaeda and its allied militants as of lesser threat than India. For Islamabad, militants including the TTP do not pose strategic threat rather they are tactical threat: the TTP normally stage attacks at least within its operational area: between 80 to 100 kilometres - within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
These attacks do not cause the destruction of say over 1500 lives or a collapse of strategic buildings or installations, instead they focuses more or less on soft targets involving the loss of few lives and some damage. The TTP Punjab Chapter has focused on some important targets in Punjab including a recent attack on the NATO logistic depot. However, theses losses were more of tactical nature as they failed to meaningfully alter the policies of the political leadership in Punjab and the army towards militancy in the province in general.
The latest proof comes from the security agencies’ new “strategy” to bring pressure to bear on the top leadership of these outfits. But in practice it means the policy of “managing” militants instead of confronting at this moment. The army might have considered the worst case scenario while adopting this policy meaning tactical losses as a result of possible militant attacks might be within the tolerance threshold as opposed to the overall utility/value of these militants in the context of possible geo-political gains.
But the TTP Punjab Chapter is known to be allied with al-Qaeda. That means they have a powerful mentor who will help sustain the TTP ideologically, financially and operationally not only in the border region but also in the Punjab so long as Islamabad has not switched to zero tolerance policy towards all types of militants and in the process has not wiped out al-Qaeda and its allies in North Waziristan. For now they have least incentive to listen to their ex-mentors (the security agencies).
The militants landscape is complex and fluid. Once a Pakistani Taliban militant can easily join the prey across the border with their Afghan counterparts (or vice versa) or may attempt to mount or sponsor a transnational attack if he gets the ability - failed bomb attack on New York - Time Square is an example.
This makes the job of Pakistan very complicated in distinguishing friendly Taliban and rogue Taliban both in FATA/Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. The militants’ outfits have evolved into a type of movement - with weak command and control structure and least coordinated operational ability.
They have acquired the ability to be mobile so as to avoid being detected and caught by the authorities. However, since militants enjoy a breathing space in FATA, they have still some workable command and control system and on hand training facility to mount attacks in other parts of the country, including Punjab.
Some expert do not believe that the TTP is a tactical threat rather they believe it is a strategic one. Pakistan is not a western country where penetration is difficult due to visa restrictions, or has a high rate of surveillance against strategic targets and or ordinary masses are vigilant so is vulnerable to spectacular attacks on its sensitive installations and transportation centres.
The TTP’s ability to mount suicide attack is considered far superior than that of their Afghan counterparts and is likened with al-Qaeda in Iraq. One reason for this could be their direct mentoring from al-Qaeda based in their vicinity in the border region.
The TTP Punjab chapter is more dangerous: It has held India and Pakistan’s relation hostage. If another Mumbai-style attack is traced to these militants in Punjab, it will again bring the two nations on the brink of a war.
“Dealing” with the murky landscape of militancy brings many challenges of its own: the likes of Col Imam, Khalid Khwaja and Hamid Gul are living examples that where the mere tool of strategic policy in Afghanistan: Taliban, becomes the ideology of the operatives of that policy.
On the other hand, support for elements of Afghan Taliban and the militant landscape in the border region has caused enormous damage to Pakistan’s own society and undermined its writ in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA in the process. As a result inhabitants of this region -predominately Pakhtuns - are facing enormous hardships and sufferings hence feeling agitated over Pakistan’s foreign policy on Afghanistan and its strategic reluctance to turn back on militancy and infrastructure of hate and religious intolerance in the Punjab.
It is no wonder nearly half of the radicalised and agitated Pakistani society outweighs any potential strategic gains in Afghanistan. However, ultimately the TTP and other militants’ survival lies in policy makers’ choice to strategically decide whether using military thrust in Afghanistan is preferable option to the humanitarian and development push for gaining strategic leverage in that country?
At present, the establishment is unlikely to adopt zero tolerance policy towards all shades of militants and shut down the infrastructure of hate and religious intolerance in Punjab up until Islamabad’s strategic interest in Afghanistan and India is secured, regardless of the cost to Pakistan’s own society, the country and the world at large.
janassakzai200@gmail.com
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