Pakistan’s NWA problem

The Statesman

Jan Assakzai North Waziristan has become a focal point for the US and Washington would like to see Pakistan’s army take out the militants as soon as possible. After behind-the-scene high level talks with Washington, Islamabad has principally agreed to launch operation but on its time of choosing. However, Islamabad is facing a dilemma: on one hand, it needs to deflect the USpressure by launching operation in North Waziristan, on the other hand, it wants to promote its geo-political interest in Afghanistan by keeping the militant infrastructure in North Waziristan and other parts of FATA. Pakistan’s attitude towards militancy is largely informed by its strategic policy on Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a geo political arena for regional powers including Pakistan. Islamabad in order to have a leverage in Afghanistan, needs Afghan Taliban so it is backing its proxy elements within Afghan Taliban and has tolerated them operationally to be in the border region. After Sept 11, Pakistan decided to join the US against the Afghan Taliban but Islamabad did not strategically delink with them altogether. During this period Pakistan-controlled elements of Taliban, influenced others and lost control with some Taliban including the Pakistani Taliban. Since then, al-Qaeda has emerged as new mentor and financier of such groups like Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani Taliban’s attacks on Pakistan’s interest stems from the ideology of al-Qaeda that Muslim governments including Pakistan are the puppets of the US, thus are a legitimate target prompting army’s operations in Swat, Malakand, South Waziristan and other parts of FATA. Pakistan’s military operation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been faced with a contradiction: one one hand it has to target the militants who are hell bent on attacking the state, on the other hand, it has to accommodate Afghan Taliban and their allies so that proxy war efforts in Afghanistan continues. Since Pakistan’s prime interest is in Afghanistan, Islamabad, on the whole, treats Pakistani Taliban as a tactical threat: making few explosions here and there claiming few lives within say, 80 to 100 kilometres radius square and that despite its intent, the operational capability of Pakistani Taliban is limited. Possible North Waziristan operation and crackdown against other militants must be seen in the context of broader threat perception of Pakistan. Islamabad views India as existential threat rather than al-Qaeda and its allied militants. Of late, Islamabad was forced to take action against Pakistani Taliban when public opinion pressure built up against the militancy particularly in Swat and Malakand. It was now time for the army to wipe out these from the settled districts. However, the army‘s operations have remained less than a clean sweep: Pakistani Taliban either melted away, moved out of the targeted areas or some of them gone back into the areas apparently cleared by the army. Pakistan’s operation in South Waziristan targeted only those Taliban that were hostile and left those who were “friendly” with Pakistan, i.e, the group led by Maulvi Nazir as its main priority is to fight in Afghanistan. In North Waziristan, Pakistan has an ally Taliban commander Gul Bahadur who is linked with the network of Afghan commander Jalaluddin Haqqani. There is a already a suggestion floated by the governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to reconcile with Taliban. In the meantime, interlocutors would be trying hard to negotiate some sort of arrangements out of media glaze with the militants. Even a story has been planted in the media that Pakistani Taliban are in disarray so if there is an operation it goes with least resistance and least damage to militants’ infrastructure. Looking at the broader picture, if it is FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where most of the militants’ infrastructure is based, and Pakistan’s Taliban have, by and large, focused on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for their attacks, it is just FINE with Islamabad. As instability in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa may makes some headlines, may causes some tactical losses, it is not going to meaningfully and strategically threaten Pakistan’s political, economic and military power house - Punjab and Sindh having a coast - notwithstanding, the heavy price Pakhtuns are paying for being caught in the middle. Pakistan understands that time is on its side at least until the US forces leave Afghanistan. The US administration is working towards its drawdown 2011 timetable. For the post-US Afghanistan, Washington needs Pakistan’s help to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan. Washington believes that Islamabad has a leverage over the Taliban in Afghanistan so not to put much pressure on Islamabad as it would make things difficult in Afghanistan. Thus the US has no leverage over Islamabad to remove militants’ infrastructure in the border region immediately. Therefore, it has to politely nudge Pakistan to take on the militants in North Waziristan. Besides, it is not in the interest of Pakistan to strategically secure and control the border region until and unless its proxy Taliban in Afghanistan get a significant dominance in the post-US Afghanistan. The ex-army chief General (R) Mirza Aslam Baig highlights this rational succinctly in his article publicised in The Nation: “Undoubtedly, the Pakistan army has been able to establish the writ of the government along the entire border region, including FATA, and for the first time our borders with Afghanistan have acquired strategic significance. The integrity of our borders therefore must be maintained, only when we are at peace with the future government in Kabul that will be none else than the government by the Taliban who control 90 percent of Afghanistan”. However, it may not be possible that Pakistan will be able to dominate most of Afghanistan, there are other regional powers who also have leverage including Iran, India and Russia and would be contesting Pakistani attempts. But the US needs Islamabad in stabilising Afghanistan and can not push Pakistan too hard; while militants in FATA and to a certain degree in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would remain within the tolerance threshold of Islamabad as long as Islamabad did not secure its interest in Afghanistan. If there is going to be a military operation in North Waziristan, it is unlikely to be significantly different from the South Waziristan one. Ultimately Pakhtuns are likely continue to suffer so long as militant infrastructure remains part of geo-political equation. The author is a London-based analyst. janassakzai200@gmail.com