Establishment’s assumptions outdated?

If we want to move forward, we need to have a   clean break with the past so that we do not become its prisoners. Then we can embark on an ambitious journey of making Pakistan a pluralistic, true democratic and federal state being owned not only by Punjabis but also by every Pakhtun, Baloch, Sindi and Siriaki

By Jan Assakzai

 The UN's report on Benazir’s murder, has highlighted what it calls the “pervasive”    role of military establishment in Pakistan, and laid bare the extent of the spy agencies’ influence in the political system which has long been suspected and talked about particularly by minority ethnic political forces of the country.

The report also indirectly vindicated the criticism   of smaller ethnic groups that the army's extra-constitutional interventions   and its role in the background over the last nearly 60 years, is the root cause of frequently derailed democratic process, the disintegration of Pakistan (in 1971),  centralisation of power, ethnic fissures, religious extremism, and, above all,  is the extension of   Punjabi domination of the state institutions.

The report has, by default, offered an opportunity to army establishment to redefine its assumptions about the real/perceived   grievances of other ethnic groups like  Pakhtuns, Balochs, Sindis  and Siriakis who are complaining of their exclusion in decision making centres and of being dominated by overwhelmingly Punjabi-dominated institution. A complaint often summarily dismissed as the out come of "provincialism/Parochialism” and linguistic politics.

While those observers who are pro army make vigorous case in favour of the army leaders’ actions and credit them with having saved the country at relevant times, the    critique of the army’s dominance in Pakistan’s political life argue that problems of political adjustment and consensus could have been sorted out through the political process, had it been allowed the time. But regardless of both sides of the argument, there is a list of army leaders’ failures that cannot be glossed over lightly:

First: to appreciate that democracy is a messy business not to be displaced or degraded by sacking assemblies: 10 assemblies were dismissed in the first 11 years of establishment of Pakistan despite the fact that founding fathers of the country promised the nation that Pakistan will be a federal parliamentary state. (Waseem, M. 2002 Causes of democratic downslide in Pakistan)

Second: to resist temptation for extra- constitutional interventions: that Pakistan’s military dominated people’s political lives over 62 years of history can be gauged from the following direct Interventions: 1958-69, 1969-71, 1977-88, and 1999-07. This period comprises over 32 years of Pakistan's political life. It was mainly because of these interventions that led people to believe that democratic aspirations were trampled upon, hence forced them to redefine their identities as Bengalis, Paktuns, Balochs, Sindis etc. vs. Punjabis. However, the sad fallout of these interventions was   the eventual   break up of the county.

Third: to keep the country together in 1971: the leadership of army after 1954 coup, set in motion the right context for crystallisation of Bengali nationalism: first, Urdu was elevated to the status of national Language ignoring the protest demonstrations of Bengalis who were especially anxious to defend their language and culture. Second, represses measures were taken in East Pakistan as a result several people died- giving martyrs to Bengali nationalists to commemorate every year. Third, after further repressive measures and denying Bengala as an official language, a belated attempt was made to recognise Bengla on the same footing as Urdu, but basic strategy of ignoring regional languages continued unabated. Fourth, under the army’s rule, the foreign exchange earnings from East Pakistani jute were allowed to be used in the development of West Pakistan while the Eastern half was deprived of development: the economic disparities were such that when Ayub Khan staged military coup in 1958, the per capita income differential between the two wings was 30 per cent; by the end of the first five-year plan in 1965, this difference increased to 45 per cent and by the time of Ayub Khan’s removal in 1968, it had grown to 61 per cent. Fifth, the last nail in the coffin of national unity was when Mujib-ur- Rahman was denied to form a government in the centre  despite winning elections (1970), eventually leading to alienation of Bengalis and break up of the county in 1971.

Fourth: to recognise hostility in Sind during the MRD movement: MRD movement (in 1983) was very hostile in Sind as seen in large scale protests. The army leadership under estimated the hostility and dealt with repressive measures. An estimated 20,000 political workers were killed; 40,000 to 1, 50,000 people made political prisoners in the crackdown of General Zia-ul- Haq. However, it surely raised the question whether the army rule was the cause of massive instability in the country.

Fifth: to prevent estrangement of Balochistan in the wake of 1974 operation: on the heel of East Pakistan’s secession, the army launched operation in 1974 against the Marry and Bugti tribes of Balochistan. Year 2004 witnessed the second major operation in Balochistan; there is not end in sight to the violence. Yet over all failure rests with army leaders to end the estrangement of Balochistan even till this date.

Sixth: to misuse Islam for political gains: the rule of Gen Zia   changed the polity of the nation for good. A tolerant Islamic and pluralistic Pakistan was religiously radicalised to contain other democratic, nationalist and secular parties, and prolong stay in power, introducing the sectarian strife that is still taking a heavy toll on Pakistani society.

Seventh: to neglect development due to one-dimensional view of security: the army leadership failed to recognise the correlations between national security and economic security of the country. Today, Pakistan is deemed to be a crumbling state: a state that can not provide basic provisions like electricity, water, job and security to its people, mainly because no emphasis has been laid over these vital aspects of governance  during  army’s rule.

Eighth: to anticipate fallout of India-centric view of national security: while the army leaders focused, through out Pakistan’s history, to contain the threat of India, it did not prepare the country and its people for the likely fallout of its proxy-wars strategy regarding India and Afghanistan: the whole society is militarised to the teeth; Punjabi Taliban in Punjab are a potent threat ready to take on state institutions while Pakhtun Taliban are bent upon brining down the legitimate government of Khyber- Pakhtunkwa challenging the internal sovereignty of the country; every day bombings have simply demoralised the people in general and of Khyber Pakhtunkwa in particular who, at best, giving up on state’s ability to protect them from violence and intimidation, and, at worst, suspecting hand in gloss relations between  the Taliban and the army- despite army’s relatively successful operation in Swat and Malakand following the occupation of Taliban. Pakhtun areas have gradually been  tuned  into safe havens  by  extremists and terrorists- unintended consequence of  strategic depth policy- as a result enormous hardships and suffering  have been heaped upon entire  Pakhtun community. It is definitely not an envious state of affairs one wish for.

Ninth: to cause Kargil debacle: (1) the army leaders conceptualised, planned and executed Kargil operation: what ever reasons being offered, it was beyond common sense as to deem  Kargil adventure  the best way forward to achieve strategic goals. Anyhow, they were left isolated by the political leadership who claimed, were not taken on board  despit  Gen  Pervez Musharraf saying that the  then Prime Minister Nawas Sharif  knew of the operation.(2) Regardless of whether  he was taken on board or not, the fact of the matter is that  army leaders never allowed civil input in the domains of foreign policy-regarding the US, India and Afghanistan relations- and national security, hence, failing to execute such polices in accordance with aspirations of people of Pakistan-a prerequisite in a democratic dispensation.

Tenth: to understand the ethnic dynamics of the county:(1) it was the predominance of Punjab in the country's military and other institutions that led to the feeling among other ethnic groups that they have been excluded from power centres by one major  ethnic group.

The following figures will prove this point:

	Quota Established in 1973	Army (2009)	Civil Servants (1993)	Autonomous Bodies and Corporations (1993)
Punjab	50%	86%	62.36%	49.94%
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	11.5%	9%	12.41%	10.17%
Sind	Urban:  7.5% Rural:  11.4% Total:   18.9%	3.2%	Urban:   9.5% Rural:    7.6% Total:    17.1%	Urban:   26.8% Rural:     8.2% Total:    35.0%
Balochistan	3.5%	1%	3.01%	2.43%

(Source:  Mohammad Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies in Pakistan,” Ethnic Studies Report).

Though the above figures (in the Table) do not reflect the accurate ethnic epresentation as there is no “ethnic” census data available,  yet, “linguistic” demographic shows  Sind and Balochistan are the least represented, flowed  by Pakhtuns.

Eleventh:  to make up for ethnic under representation and under employment in the army: since British Colonial Raj, Northern Punjab is  proportionally over represented in the army.  In 1995, every third person in Rawalpindi Division was from the armed forces whilst every fifth person (retired) was from Punjab province. As such being an employer,  its riffle effects could be felt across the province.

Twelfth: to stop armed forces from being smeared: successive army interventions created a taste of political power among its many leaders. A time also witnessed a naval chief fired for a corruption scandal. The overall image of the forces was badly smeared. Their former sheen and prestige had suffered. Their confidence and sharpness was reduced. They came to be treated like any other department of the Government of Pakistan and often assigned duties far removed from the business of warfare. “Somewhere along the line they also picked up some of the tasteless peculiarities of their civilian counterparts and became poorer in self-regard”, succeinctly put by a commentator.

Nevertheless, only a fool would argue against the role and contribution of armed forces in the security of any country: take the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan; due to lack of professional army, the former fell prey to small groups of vigilantees, and the later became hostage to bandits and mercenaries. However, in Pakistan it is because of    frequent coups staged by the overwhelmingly Punjabi army as well as the army's background role and influence in public sector and civil institutions of the country, that has mainly created trust deficit between smaller ethnic groups, on one hand, and Punjabi-dominated establishment, on the other. Yet to be fair, homage is  due as well to the army's finest soldiers who lost their lives in Swat and Malakand battling Taliban. My heart goes to those fallen soldiers and their families. Besides, army is rightly credited for its effective role in emergencies like earthquake, flooding, distribution of aid and mounting rescue efforts.

However, at the time when Pakistan is facing its worst crises in its history: crumbling state institutions in proving electricity, water, jobs, and security, there is a need for new a mindset on the part of military establishment ready to acknowledge as to what went wrong and being open to new solutions. Though it is a hard sell, the way forward could be:

A: truth and reconciliation commission modelled on South African example, may be established to find out the truth as to what went wrong in Pakistan’s 62 years chequered history including unearthing perpetrators of East Pakistan debacle.

B: all acts of ommission and commission by the establishment and other stack holders, be recoded in the commission so as to straight the record; Hamood-Ur-Rahman Commission report should be made public to draw lessons and a pledge that these mistakes are not repeated; those who violated the constitution and are alive, should come forward and apologise to the nation; otherwise, be made to apologise.

C: all victims of subsequent martial laws should be compensated and memorials be established in Pakistan's major cities and towns to honour those martyrs who were killed during the struggle for democracy and provincial autonomy.

D: Parliament be allowed to formulate polices on all issues including foreign policy and national security.

E: all institutions should be allowed to work within the parameter set in the constitution.

F: Interference by spy agencies in politics should be virtually stopped.

G: representation figures of smaller ethnic groups should be established on the basis of "ethnic" census rather than "linguistic” demographic and as such thus-obtained-quota be implemented in all national institutions including Pakistan army, in letter and spirit.

If we want to move forward, we need to have a   clean break with the past so that we do not become its prisoners. Then we can embark on an ambitious journey of making Pakistan a pluralistic, true democratic and federal state being owned not only by Punjabis but also by every Pakhtun, Baloch, Sindi and Siriaki. Hence, the proverbial ball is in the army establishment’s court to revise its decade old assumptions about smaller ethnic groups,  listen to and mitigate their grievances  making up for the time lost in denial. Is it any wonder that smaller ethnic groups, at the front line of many policies of army establishment, see things differently?

Janassakzai200@gmail.com